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THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT-FINDING MIDDLE GROUND 
BETWEEN OPPORTUNITY AND OPPORTUNISM: THE "ORIGINAL 
SOURCE" PROVISION OF 31 U.S.c. § 3730(e)(4) 
INTRODUCTION 
The Civil False Claims Act! was originally enacted during the 
Civil War when fraud, price gouging, and deliveries of defective 
weapons plagued the Union Anny.2 Under the False Claims Act 
("Act" or "False Claims Act"), a private citizen, acting on behalf of 
the United States, can bring suit against someone who has allegedly 
defrauded the government, earning a portion of the recovery if the 
suit is successful.3 Throughout its 130 year history, the False Claims 
Act has been viewed by some commentators as an opportunity for 
the recovery of lost revenue, the weapon of vigilant taxpayers who 
file suit attempting to recoup losses for their defrauded govern­
ment, a deterrent against unlawful activity, and a means of supple­
menting the federal treasury.4 Others have seen the False Claims 
Act as a vehicle for opportunistic plaintiffs, whose suits both actu­
ally reduce the amount of federal recovery from unscrupulous con­
tractors and interfere with the federal government's efforts to 
1. 31 u.s.c. §§ 3729-3733 (1988). 
2. JOHN T. BOESE, CNIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM AcnONS, 1-3 (1993). 
3. 31 u.s.c. § 3730(b), (d). 
4. Since ... amendments [were] enacted in 1986 which revived the act, the 
[False Oaims Act] has brought $588 million back into the Treasury. The Gov­
ernment now recovers more money through these whistle-blower lawsuits 
than through suits initiated by the Justice Department. Not surprisingly, De­
fense contractors hate the whistle-blower law .... These same companies have 
paid out more than a half-billion dollars in penalties and settlements for fraud 
in just the past 3 fiscal years - a quarter of which comes from whistleblower 
lawsuits alone. 
140 CoNG. REc. S1915-01 (daily ed. Feb. 25,1994) (statement of Sen. Grassley, sponsor 
of the 1986 amendments to the False Claims Act). See James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert 
Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims 
Act, the 1986 Amendments to the False Claims Act and Their Application in the United 
States ex reL Gravitt v. General Electric Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 35, 72, 
74-75 (1991) [hereinafter War Stories]. 
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curtail fraud.5 
These two conflicting views are reflected in a current split 
among the United States courts of appeals over the proper interpre­
tation of one component of the Act's jurisdictional requirements: 
the "original source" provision in section 3730(e)(4), which covers 
subject matter jurisdiction of private plaintiff suits under the Act.6 
This section of the Act is implicated where a private plaintiff's suit, 
brought on behalf of the government, is based upon allegations and 
transactioris that have been publicly disclosed.? The private plain­
tiff is barred from maintaining such a suit unless she can show that 
she is an original source as defined in the statute, i.e., has direct and 
independent knowledge of the information that forms the basis for 
her suit.8 Some courts of appeals have construed the statute 
broadly to allow plaintiffs to bring an action whenever they can 
show some direct and independent knowledge of the information 
that has been publicly disclosed.9 Other courts of appeals have con­
5. "You can't have private citizens running around as bounty hunters after 
corporations . . . . Thming that power over to any Tom, Dick or Harry is a 
very unfair way to proceed. That's no way to run the government." ... [I]t 
destroys business relationships and further diminishes [the Pentagon's] diluted 
authority. 
Ralph Vartabedian, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993 at Al (quoting former United States 
Attorney General William Barr). See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settling for 
Less: The Department ofJustice's Command Performance Under the 1986 False Claims 
Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409 (1993); Francis E. Purcell, Jr., Comment, 
Qui Tam Suits Under the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986: The Need for Clear 
Legislative Expression, 42 CA1H. U. L. REv. 935, 948 (1993). 
6. § 3730(e)(4)(A), (B). The original source provision of § 3730(e)(4) bars a pri­
vate plaintiff from bringing suit under the Act where information that forms the basis of 
the suit is in the public domain, unless the plaintiff is an original source of the informa­
tion. [d. See infra notes 66-71 and accompanying text for a full definition of the origi­
nal source provision; see also part II, infra, for a discussion of the split in the courts of 
appeals. 
7. § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
8. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
9. See Cooper ex reL United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d 
562,567 (11th Cir. 1994) (plaintiff allowed to bring suit where, despite public disclosure 
of information in suit, plaintiff had direct knowledge obtained independently); United 
States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1347-49 (4th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (plaintiff allowed to maintain suit despite public disclosure 
if knowledge of transactions and allegations is direct and independent); United States 
ex rei. Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (informa­
tion gleaned from discovery in prior suit insufficient to indicate fraud; plaintiffs addi­
tional knowledge of defendant's activities and subsequent interviews gave it direct and 
independent information); United States ex rel Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 
F.2d 548, 553 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993) (plaintiff allowed to 
maintain suit only where knowledge is direct and independent); United States ex rei. 
Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991) ("original source" 
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strued the provision narrowly to prohibit such suits by plaintiffs, 
fearing that plaintiffs whose information is not wholly original are 
seeking only to capitalize on information that has already been pub­
licly disclosed. These courts have required a private plaintiff to be a 
"whistle-blower," the individual responsible for any public disclo­
sure, in order to maintain her suit.10 Although the split among the 
United States courts of appeals reflects divergent policy goals, the 
key to understanding these two different approaches lies in the 
method of statutory construction used in interpreting this critical 
provision: the interpretation of the plain language of the Act and 
the weight and meaning to be accorded to the Act's extensive and 
complex legislative history as evidence of congressional intent and 
purpose. 
This Note addresses the jurisdictional requirements expressed 
in section 3730( e)( 4) of the Act,11 specifically the "original source" 
provisions that bar a private plaintiff from maintaining a suit under 
the Act where information that forms the basis of her suit has been 
publicly disclosed. Part I presents the historical background and 
legislative history of this oft-amended Act, including a review of the 
language of section 3730(e)(4). Part II traces the development of 
two branches of thought in the federal courts concerning the appli­
cation of the jurisdictional bar to suits under the Act. Part III re­
views principles of statutory construction and the legislative history 
of the Act to conclude that the criteria for subject matter jurisdic­
tion in the statute are sufficient to protect against parasitic suits 
under the False Claims Act without requiring that the plaintiff in 
such suits be the individual responsible for any public disclosure. 
requires direct and independent knowledge); United States ex rei. Houck v. Folding 
Carton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 504 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, 
and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 0990) (direct and independent knowledge required of 
an "original source"); United States ex reL Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., 721 F. Supp. 1247, 1257 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (plaintiff with direct and independent 
knowledge of the fraudulent practices is not barred from bringing suit). See infra part 
II.B for a discussion of the courts of appeals which use "direct and independent" as the 
standard for detennining "original source" under § 3730(e)(4). 
10. See Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 
1992) (jurisdiction under False Claims Act is only appropriate for those who have been 
instrumental in the public disclosure of allegations of fraud); United States ex rei. Dick 
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990) (plaintiff must have directly 
or indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed· the allegations); United 
States ex rei. Fine v. MK Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544 (D.N.M. 1994) (adopting 
reasoning of Second and Ninth Circuits). See infra part II.A for a discussion of the 
"whistle-blower" requirement imposed by these circuits on the "original source" provi­
sion of § 3730(e)(4). 
11. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A), (B). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Legislative History12 
1. The False Claims Act of 1863 
The False Claims Act13 was originally enacted in 1863 in re­
sponse to congressional outrage over fraud committed by unscrupu­
lous contractors against the War Department during the Civil 
War.14 The Act, known at the time as the "Lincoln Law,"15 pro­
vided civil and criminal penalties for individuals convicted of know­
ingly submitting false claims to the government.16 Concerned that 
the federal government would be unable to uncover all instances of 
fraud, Congress established a cause of action for private individuals 
with knowledge of fraudulent acts,17 This cause of action, known as 
a qui tam suit,18 authorized private plaintiffs to bring suit on behalf 
12. The legislative history of the False Claims Act from 1863-1986 has been 
comprehensively recorded. For an early thorough analysis in case law, see United 
States ex reL LaValley v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 707 F. Supp. 1351, 1354-56 (D. 
Mass. 1988). The most detailed history appears in War Stories, supra note 4, at 35-47. 
For additional full recitations of this lengthy history, see also BOESE, supra note 2; 
Kolis, supra note 5, at 413-20. 
13. 31 U.S.c. §§ 3729-33. 
14. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-5. Unscrupulous contractors were becoming "'pro­
verbially and notoriously rich.'" United States ex reL Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles 
and Space Co., Inc., 722 F. Supp. 607,609 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (quoting 1 F. SHANNON, THE 
ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY, 1861-1865, 54-56 (1965) 
(citation omitted». 
For sugar [the government] often got sand; for coffee, rye; for leather, some­
thing no better than brown paper; for sound horses and mules, spavined beasts 
and dying donkeys; and for serviceable muskets and pistols, the experimental 
failures of sanguine inventors, or the refuse of shops and foreign armories. 
Id. (quoting SHANNON, supra, at 58 (citation omitted». 
15. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-3. 
16. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENT Acr OF 
1986, S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266,5267, and in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS AMENDMENTS Acr 
OF 1986, § 2 at 8 [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
17. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266,5267, and in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, § 2 at 10. 
18. The term "qui tam" comes from the Latin phrase, "qui tam pro domino rege 
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur," which translates as "who brings the action for 
the king as well as for himself." Erickson ex reL United States v. American Inst. of 
Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 909 n.l (E.D. Va. 1989) (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, 
CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 160 (1768». "A qui tam action is one in 
which the plaintiff sues for himself and on behalf of the government to recover a pen­
alty under a statute which provides that part of the penalty is awarded to the party 
bringing the suit and the remainder of the penalty is awarded to the government." 
United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100, 1102 n.1 (7th Cir. 1984). A qui 
tam provision enables parties who are not directly injured, and therefore would other­
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of the United States to recover money acquired through "false 
claims" which had been submitted to the government,19 As an in­
centive, the private plaintiffs, called "relators,"2o were offered the 
chance to recover half of the damages and forfeitures collected, 
plus costs, if the litigation proved successfu1.21 
2. The 1943 Amendments: Congressional Reaction to 
United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess22 
In the years following its enactment, the Act was seldom uti­
lized. During the 1930s and 1940s, however, increased government 
spending brought new opportunities for unscrupulous contractors 
to collect fraudulent profits.23 The original provisions of the Act 
did not restrict the ability of private plaintiffs to bring a qui tam suit 
even where the suits were based on publicly disclosed informa­
tion.24 As a result, a series of "parasitic" civil suits were brought by 
opportunistic plaintiffs, in which the allegations in the qui tam suit 
were actually derived from previously issued criminal indictments 
by the government,25 In the most famous of these cases, United 
States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess,26 electrical contractors, who were em­
ployed to work on Public Works Administration projects near Pitts­
burgh, were indicted for defrauding the government, pled nolo 
contendere, and were fined $54,000.27 Subsequent to that criminal 
action, a qui tam plaintiff brought a civil action under the Act 
wise lack standing to bring the suit, to sue on behalf of the Government. BOESE, supra 
note 2, at 1-4. 
19. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-3 to 1-4. 
20. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275. 
21. Id. Although used originally to combat fraud in the defense industry, the 
False Claims Act has recently been useful in prosecuting health care fraud. See David 
J. Ryan, The False Claims Act: An Old Weapon with New Firepower Is Aimed at Health 
Care Fraud, 4 ANN. OF HEALTH LAW 127 (1995). 
22. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See infra notes 26-30 and accompanying text. 
23. BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-10. 
24. Id. The relevant portion of the Act at the time of the decision in Hess read as 
follows: "Such suit may be brought and carried on by any person, as well as for himself 
as for the United States ...." Act of March 2, 1863, Ch. 67, § 4, 12 Stat. 698 (1863) 
(codified as amended 31 U.S.c. § 232 (1943) and recodified as amended 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 3729-3731 (1986» (punishment of fraud upon the federal government). 
25. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Ostrager v. New Orleans Chap. Associated 
Gen. Contractors, Inc., 317 U.S. 562 (1943) (qui tam plaintiff had standing to sue on 
behalf of the United States where claim was based upon previous criminal indictments); 
see also S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. at 10 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5275; BOESE, supra note 2, at 1-11. 
26. 317 U.S. 537 (1943). 
27. Id. at 539, 545. 
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against the contractors that resulted in a judgment of $315,000.28 
Despite arguments by the government that the suit should not be 
allowed, the United States Supreme Court in Hess held that the 
False Claims Act did not bar a qui tam suit where the complainant 
might have obtained his information from a previous indictment,29 
Significantly, the Court refused to read restrictions into the plain 
language of the statute and instead offered to Congress the oppor­
tunity to provide "specifically for the amount of new information 
which the informer must produce to be entitled to reward."30 
Reaction to the Court's decision in Hess was swift. In the next 
session of Congress, Attorney General Francis Biddle requested 
that Congress repeal the entire qui tam provision.31 The House of 
Representatives followed his direction.32 The Senate, however, was 
reluctant to eliminate the provision altogether, citing fears of gov­
ernmental delay and inadequate enforcement if the qui tam provi­
sion were totally repealed.33 The final amendment reflected a 
compromise between the two camps:34 the Act, after the 1943 
amendments, retained the qui tam provision, but barred relators 
from bringing actions that were "based on evidence or information 
the government had when the action was brought."35 
This restriction on actions by qui tam plaintiffs had effects 
which had not been anticipated by the legislature.36 As a result of 
28. [d. at 539-40. 
29. [d. at 545. 
30. [d. at 546 & n.9. 
31. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.AN. at 5276. 
32. [d. 
33. [d. 
34. An exception present in the original Senate version of the bill, which would 
have allowed a qui tam plaintiff to bring an action if the information on which the suit 
was based was "original" with such person, was dropped in conference from the final 
version. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 5266, 
5277. 
35. 31 U.S.c. § 3730(b)(4) (1982) (superseded). After the 1943 amendments, the 
language of this section read as follows: "(4) Unless the Government proceeds with the 
action, the court shall dismiss an action brought by the person on discovering the action 
is based on evidence or information the Government had when the action was 
brought." [d. 
36. The language of the floor debate reveals that Congress assumed many qui tam 
actions could still be maintained after the passage of the 1943 Amendments. Senator 
Van Nuys, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated his belief that "the pro­
posal 'protects the honest informer as nearly we can do it by statute (and) ... would not 
prevent an honest informer from coming in.''' S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 
(1986) (quoting 89 CoNG. REe. 7609 (1943)), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN. 5266, 5277 
(alterations in the original). Representative Kefauver commented, "[If] the average, 
1995]THE ORIGINAL SOURCE PROVISION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 261 

the passage of the 1943 amendments, a qui tam plaintiff who was 
jurisdictionally barred from bringing a suit not only lost the oppor­
tunity to recover a portion of the award, but also was precluded 
from objecting to settlements or dismissals of the suit and from 
challenging any lack of diligence on the part of the investigating 
governmental agency.37 Further, the jurisdictional bar was held by 
the courts to preclude a suit by a qui tam plaintiff even where the 
plaintiff had originally furnished the information to the government 
before filing suit, as well as suits by plaintiffs who independently 
acquired information of fraud that the government also happened 
to possess.38 
3. The 1986 Amendments: Congressional Reaction to 
United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean39 
As in 1943,40 congressional action was once again spurred by a 
judicial decision that seemed to contradict the original purposes of 
the Act.41 In Dean, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that the jurisdictional restrictions in the Act 
barred a qui tam action brought by the State of Wisconsin in a civil 
suit charging Medicaid fraud.42 Under the applicable federal Medi­
care statute, the state had been required to disclose its investigation 
good American citizen ... has the information and he gives it to the Government, and 
the Government does not proceed in due course, provision is made here where he can 
get some compensation." Id. (quoting 89 CoNG REc. 10846 (1943». 
37. Id. 
38. See, e.g. United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean; 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(jurisdiction denied even where state disclosure of investigation to federal agency was 
required by statute). See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text. See also United 
States v. Aster, 275 F.2d 281 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 894 (1960) (jurisdiction 
denied where information upon which qui tam suit was based was in the possession of 
the federal government prior to the filing of a suit by the individual who provided such 
information to the government); United States ex reL McCans v. Armour & Co., 146 F. 
Supp. 546,550 (D.D.C. 1956), affd, 254 F.2d 90 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 
(1958) (government auditor barred from bringing false claims suit where notice to su­
pervisors of fraudulent activity put information into possession of the government 
before suit was filed). 
39. 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984). 
40. See supra part 1.A.2 for a discussion of the 1943 amendments. For a particu­
larly detailed discussion of the case law between the 1943 and 1986 Amendments, see 
Cern Kaner, Cheh-Cheng Wang ex reL The United States of America v. FMC Corp.: 
False Claims Act Bar May Be Overturned by Pending Legislation, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REv. 279, 282-85 (1993). 
41. "Once again, the passage of time revealed that Congress, in its attempt to 
evade Scylla, had steered precipitously close to Charybdis." United States ex rei. 
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reciting thor­
ough legislative history of the Act). 
42. Dean, 729 F.2d at 1100. 
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of Medicaid fraud to the Department of Health and Human Serv­
ices.43 The court in Dean held that this disclosure operated to pre­
clude the state from acting as a qui tam plaintiff in a false claims 
suit, because, following the state's required disclosure, the federal 
government "had the information when the action was brought," 
thus triggering the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(b)( 4).44 The 
court suggested that "[i]f the State of Wisconsin desires a special 
exemption to the False Claims Act because of its requirement to 
report Medicaid fraud to the federal government, then it should ask 
Congress to provide the exemption."45 
Immediately following the court's ruling in Dean, the National 
Association of Attorneys General adopted a resolution urging Con­
gress to "rectify the unfortunate result" of that decision, arguing 
that the court's holding unnecessarily inhibited the "detection and 
prosecution of fraud on the Govemment."46 
In response to both the outcry over the holding in Dean and a 
concern over the growing pervasiveness of fraud against the gov­
ernment, Congress moved in 1986 to amend the Act once again.47 
The Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee on the 1986 Amend­
ments stated that the purpose of the proposed legislation was to 
"provide the Government's law enforcers with more effective 
tools" and to "encourage any individual knowing of Government 
fraud to bring that information forward."48 As the means to ac­
complish the second of these goals, the Senate bill increased incen­
tives for private plaintiffs to bring actions on behalf of the 
government, including increased awards and revision of the juris­
dictional provisions that had inhibited qui tam actions since 1943.49 
43. Id. at 1103. 
44. Id. at 1102. 
45. Id. at 1106. 
46. S. REP. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5278. 
47. Id. at 2-3, 13, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67, 5278. 
48. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266-67. 
49. Id. at 17, 23-30, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5282, 5288-2595. See 
also False Claims Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Admin. Practice 
and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (statement of 
Sen. Charles E. Grassley, sponsor of S. 1562), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 16, § 4, at 1-3 ("The original False Claims Act is rooted in the realization 
that we cannot guard against Government fraud without the aid of private citizen in­
formers.... When Congress amended the law in 1943 the act's incentive and utility for 
private citizens was removed."); False Claims Act Amendments of 1986: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (statement of Rep. Berman, spon­
sor of H.R. 4827), reprinted in 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, § 6 at 95 ("We 
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Specifically addressing the problem faced by the State of Wisconsin 
in Dean, the final version of the bill provided that actions based 
upon "public disclosure of allegations" are allowed if the person 
who brings the action is the "original source of the information. "50 
The statute went on to define "original source" as "an individual 
who has direct and independent knowledge of the information on 
which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the 
information to the Government before filing an action under this 
section which is based on the information."51 The "original source" 
language was intended by the sponsors of the legislation to preclude 
the parasitic actions of the Hess era.52 Thus, Congress attempted to 
create more opportunities for private plaintiffs to bring qui tam 
suits under the Act, while simultaneously maintaining a jurisdic­
tional bar against the opportunistic "parasitical actions" that had 
characterized such suits before the 1943 amendments.53 
4. The Language of the 1986 Amendments54 
Regrettably, instead of putting the issue of "opportunity versus 
must prevent suits from being dismissed simply by the Government's assertion that the 
Government already had the information brought forward by the plaintiff in order to 
ensure that the Government is indeed acting on that information."). 
50. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). 
51. § 3730(e)(4)(B). The full text of the relevant portion of the statute is as 
follows: 
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based 
upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac­
counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me­
dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person 
bringing the action is an original source of the information. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual who 
has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega­
tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern­
ment before filing an action under this section which is based on the 
information. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A), (B). 
52. See United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). "This amend­
ment seeks to assure that a qui tam action based solely on public disclosures cannot be 
brought by an individual with no direct and independent knowledge of the information 
or who had not been the original source to the entity that disclosed the allegations." 
(statement by Sen. Grassley, sponsor, 1986 Amendments, 132 CoNG. REc. S11244 
(daily ed. Aug. 11, 1986). See also supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of parasitic actions. 
53. Purcell, supra note 5, at 942-43, 948. 
54. For a complete discussion of the 1986 amendments, including relevant case 
law and procedural changes, see Richard J. Oparil, The Coming Impact ofthe Amended 
False Claims Act, 22 AKRON L. REv. 525 (1989). 
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opportunism" to rest, the 1986 amendments to the Act served only 
to create additional controversy.55 Lacking clear legislative his­
tory,56 the federal courts have developed a variety of individual 
standards for determining whether a particular qui tam plaintiff has 
crossed the line from "honest" to "parasitic" informer. 57 The courts 
have wrestled with precise definitions for three key terms in the 
jurisdictional bar of section 3730(e)(4): the concepts of "based 
upon," "public disclosure," and "original source."58 Section 
3730(e)(4)(A) provided that "[n]o court shall have jurisdiction over 
an action under this section based upon the public disclosure of 
allegations or transactions ... unless the action is brought by the 
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original 
source of the information. "59 "Original source" was defined in sec­
55. See, part II, infra, for a discussion of the split in the federal circuits. See also 
Kolis, supra note 5, at 419-26 for a thorough discussion of the language of the entire 
1986 amendments. 
56. United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d 
Cir. 1991). "The ... 1986 amendments underwent substantial revisions during [their] 
legislative path. This provides ample opportunity to search the legislative history and 
find some support somewhere for almost any construction of the many ambiguous 
terms in the final version." Id. 
57. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5, 7-8. See also part II, infra. 
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). 
59. Id. (emphasis added). Although this Note deals with the "Original source" 
provision in the jurisdictional bar of § 3730(e)(4), the manner in which a series of alle­
gations can be said to be "based upon previously disclosed" information relates tangen­
tially to the question of "original source" and thus bears some brief discussion. For a 
thorough and detailed analysis of "based upon previously disclosed" and the case law 
surrounding the jurisdictional bar of § 3730(e)(4), see Robert Salcido, Screening Out 
Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure Juris­
dictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act, 24 Pus. CONT. L.J. 237 
(1995). 
The question of whether the series of allegations is "publicly disclosed" is a thresh­
old question. United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548, 552 
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993). See also BOESE, supra note 2, at 4­
26. If the information upon which the false claims action is based has not been publicly 
disclosed, the court questioning the applicability of the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(4) 
need never reach the question of whether the allegations are based upon the disclosed 
information. Precision, 971 F.2d at 552-53; Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 
975 F.2d 1412, 1416 (9th CiT. 1992) ("Where there has been no 'public disclosure' within 
the meaning of section 3730(e)(4)(A), there is no need for a qui tam plaintiff to show 
that he is the 'original source' of the information.") (citing, e.g., United States ex rei. 
Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 929 F.2d 1416, 1419-20 (9th Cir. 1991». Fur­
ther, because the "based upon publicly disclosed" information is designed to be a 
"quick trigger" test, the qui tam plaintiff does not have to demonstrate that it fulfills the 
qualifications for an "original source" unless the information upon which the false 
claims suit is founded has been held to be based upon publicly disclosed information. 
Precision, 971 F.2d at 552-53. Some circuits, however, have used the "based upon pub­
licly disclosed" standard as a more exacting threshold test, limiting the application of 
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tion 3730 (e)(4)(B) as "an individual who has direct and independ­
ent knowledge of the information on which the allegations are 
based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern­
ment before filing an action . . . which is based on the informa­
tion."60 Thus, under the statute, a qui tam plaintiff could bring a 
suit under the False Claims Act which was "based upon" "publicly 
disclosed"61 information as long as the plaintiff was an "original 
source" of that information.62 To qualify as an "original source" 
under the Act, however, a relator must first have "direct and in-
the "original source" standard where some of the infonnation upon which the false 
claims suit is based is in the public domain. See, e.g., United States ex rei. Springfield 
Tenninal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994). See also infra notes 144-159 
and accompanying text for a discussion of the District of Columbia Circuit's detailed 
analysis of the "based upon/publicly disclosed" test in Quinn. 
60. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
61. § 3730(e)(4). In defining the tenn "publicly disclosed," Congress specified 
particular circumstances in which the threshold test might apply. § 3730(e)(4)(A). The 
language of the statute precludes actions based upon "the public disclosure of allega­
tions or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional, 
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investiga­
tion, or from the news media." Id. This provision has been interpreted by the courts to 
include any infonnation that has been disclosed through civil litigation which is on file 
with the clerk's office. United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 
1339, 1350 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (citing United States ex reL 
Springfield Tenninal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645,651 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States 
ex rei. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d 
Cir.), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993); United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch 
Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548,554 n.5 (10th Cir. 1992), cerL denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993); 
United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154-56 (3d Cir. 
1991». 
62. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Even if the infonnation has been publicly disclosed, the qui 
tam plaintiff nonetheless need not show herself to be an "original source" unless the 
infonnation upon which her suit is founded is "based upon" that publicly disclosed 
infonnation. Precision, 971 F.2d at 552. 
Some courts of appeals have held that qui tam actions are "based upon" a public 
disclosure whenever the factual basis for the action has been disclosed into the public 
domain. See United States ex reL Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509, 1527 (8th Cir. 
1994). cerL denied. 115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995) (Magill, J., dissenting) ("'based upon' ... has 
been broadly interpreted by other courts of appeals to mean 'based in any part upon"'); 
United States ex reL Springfield Tenninal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 652-55 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) (intent of Congress was to prohibit qui tam actions if the allegations or trans­
actions "were in the public domain"); Precision, 971 F.2d at 552 ("based upon" means 
"supported by"); United States ex reL Doe v. John Doe Corp., 960 F.2d 318, 324 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (qui tam plaintiffs action is "based upon" a publicly disclosed allegation 
where the relator's allegations are· "the same ... regardless of where the relator ob­
tained his infonnation"). But see United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 
21 F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir.), cerL denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (the proper interpreta­
tion of "to base upon" is "to use as a basis for" (citation omitted); plain language of 
statute indicates close relationship is required before relator can be considered to have 
based qui tam action on previously disclosed allegations). 
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dependent" knowledge of the information upon which the allega­
tions in the qui tam suit are based.63 Second, the relator must have 
voluntarily provided the information to the government before fil­
ing the qui tam 'action.64 
Defendants in false claims suits soon found ambiguity in this 
section, which provided support for motions to dismiss in a wide 
range of circumstances.65 The courts' broad definition of the first 
part of the jurisdictional analysis, whether the allegations had been 
"publicly disclosed" and whether the qui tam action was "based 
upon" that disclosure, served with increasing frequency to focus the 
jurisdictional decision on the second part of the test, whether the 
qui tam plaintiff was an "original source."66 This critical provision 
has been variously interpreted by the federal courts, leading one 
commentator to term it "the most litigated - and confused - issue 
under the qui tam provisions."67 Some courts of appeals have im­
posed an additional criterion to the statutory requirements of "di­
rect and independent" and require a qui tam plaintiff to be the 
source of the public disclosure, the "whistieblower," in order to 
maintain jurisdiction under section 3730(e)(4).68 Other courts of 
appeals have relied on the "plain language" of the statute, holding 
that a qui tam plaintiff is only barred under section 3730(e)(4) 
where she did not have direct and independent knowledge of the 
allegations that formed the basis for her complaint.69 The confu­
sion surrounding this aspect of the jurisdictional bar has allowed 
some qui tam suits to go forward where the plaintiff was not clearly 
the original source of the information7o and has barred other suits 
where the qui tam plaintiff was the sole source for inside informa­
tion about fraud perpetuated on the federal government.71 
63. § 3730(e)(4)(B). 
64. Id. 
65. See infra part II. 
66. BOESE, supra note 2, at 4-27 to 4-34. "As the definition of 'public disclosure' 
is broadened by the courts, this 'original source' question will become one of the most 
critical segments of the qui tam provisions." [d. at 4-34. But see United States ex rel. 
Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (detailed analysis of 
"based upon/publicly disclosed" threshold test). 
67. BOESE, supra note 2, at 4-35. 
68. See, e.g., United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 
(2d Cir. 1990). 
69. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994). 
70. See, e.g., id. 
71. See, e.g., Wang ex rel. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 
1992); United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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5. The Proposed 1992 and 1993 Amendments72 
The sponsors of the 1986 amendments were not unaware of the 
controversy· that had been created by the. language in section 
3730(e)(4).73 Consequently, in 1992, Congress attempted to resolve 
the varying interpretations of the jurisdictional bar in section 
3730(e)(4) by trying to pass yet another series of amendments to 
the False Claims Act. In August 1992, the House passed House Bill 
4563 and sent it to the Senate accompanied by the Report of the 
House Committee on the Judiciary.74 In its report, the committee 
took n:ote of several federal appellate court decisions and con­
cluded that "clarifications ... are necessary in light of a number of 
incorrect interpretations of the parasitic suit ban in the current 
Act. "75 According to the committee report, the 1992 amendment 
was specifically drafted to insure that the jurisdictional bar applied 
only where "all of the material facts and allegations" were drawn 
from the sources enumerated in the statute.76 Further, the amend­
ment was intended to set the record straight concerrung the "origi­
nal source" language of the Act: "If the case is based in whole or in 
pan on sources other than those described in section 3730(e)(4), it 
72. See Purcell, supra note 5, at 967-76 for a detailed discussion of the 1992 
amendments while they were still under consideration by Congress. 
73. H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992). 
74. H.R. 4563, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The relevant text of the proposed 
amendment provided: 
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action brought under subsec­
tion (b) in which all of the material facts and allegations are obtained from a 
news media report or reports, or a disclosure to the general public of a docu­
ment or documents ­
(i) created by the Federal Government; 
(ii) filed in a lawsuit to which the Federal Government is a party; or 
(iii) relating to an open and active investigation by the Federal Govern­
ment; unless the person bringing the action is an original source of such 
facts and allegations. 
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, an individual is an "original source" of 
material facts and allegations if such individual has knowledge, independent 
from the sources listed in subparagraph (A), of such facts and allegations and 
has voluntarily provided them to the Government. The person bringing the 
action shall also be considered an original source of any material facts or alle­
gations developed as a result ofinformation provided to the Government by that 
person. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
75. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1992). 
76. Id. at 13 (emphasis added). "H.R. 4563 specifically targets an overly restric­
tive reading of the jurisdictional bar so as to encourage private parties to expose fraud 
otherwise unknown to the government." Purcell, supra note 5, at 973 (citing H.R. REp. 
No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1992)). 
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may pe brought by any person with access to information; from 
whatever source, that will support a cause of action filed under the 
Act."?? 
The committee report specifically cited the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in United States 
ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co. ("LILCO"), which re­
quired a qui tam plaintiff to have "directly or indirectly been a 
source to the entity that publicly disclosed the allegations on which 
a suit is based,"?8 and pointedly rejected the Second Circuit's inter­
pretation.?9 Instead, the committee report noted that the phrase 
"material facts and allegations" was purposefully repeated in the 
section of House Bill 4563 that de~1t with subject matter jurisdic­
tion.8o The use of "material facts and allegations" in House Bill 
4563, in place of the phrases "allegations or transactions" and "in­
formation" in the 1986 Amendments, was intended to eliminate any 
textual difference that had been erroneously inferred by the courts 
of appeals.81 
The House Committee had high hopes for House Bill 4563.82 
The amendments in section 3 alone were expected to increase in­
centives for private plaintiffs and remove jurisdictional barriers, re­
sulting in larger recoveries for the government under the False 
Claims Act.83 The committee's hopes were dashed when the bill 
languished and died in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.84 
In 1993, Congress again attempted to pass amendments to the 
77. H.R. REp. No. 837, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1992) (emphasis added). 
78. Id. (quoting United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 
13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990)). See infra notes 100-104 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of LILCO. 





84. 138 CONGo REc. Sl2570 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992). The only Senate action 
concerning the False Claims Act in the 102d Congress was Senate Bill 2785, introduced 
in May of 1992 by Senator Thurmond, which had the sole purpose of barring any qui 
tam action based on information obtained in the course or scope of government em­
ployment. S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). The fates of House Bill 4563 and Sen­
ate Bill 2785 are subject to speculation, although a possible clue to Congress' inaction 
could be found in the fact that H.R. 4563, in addition to clarifying § 3730(e)(4), also 
amended § 3730(b)(4) to allow government employees to bring qui tam suits under 
carefully controlled circumstances. This change placed the House bill in direct opposi­
tion to the technical amendment offered in Senate Bill 2785, which proscribed such 
suits. H.R. 4563, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 2785, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). 
Alternatively, the bill may have fallen prey to substantial lobbying efforts on the part of 
defense contractors who have consistently resisted congressional efforts to liberalize the 
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Act. A new bill, Senate Bill 841, was introduced by Senator 
Charles Grassley on April 29, 1993.85 This bill proposed a series of 
amendments which would have completely stricken the jurisdic­
tional bar in section 3730(e)(4) and would have instead added new 
language to section 3730(b). Under the proposed amendment, the 
government could have moved to dismiss a relator from a suit filed 
under the False Claims Act if "all the necessary and specific mate­
rial allegations contained in such action were derived from an open 
and active fraud investigation by the Government."86 Senate Bill 
841 was referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee for 
consideration.87 
Three months later, Representative' Howard Berman intro­
duced House Bill 2915 in the House.88 This version of the bill also 
would have stricken section 3730(e)(4) and added language to sec­
tion 3730(b)(6). In addition to the language proposed in Senate Bill 
841 for section 3730(b)(A)(i), the House version would have al­
lowed the government to move to dismiss a qui tam plaintiff where 
there was an ongoing governmental investigation which had been 
initiated before the relator had filed her complaint. Under the 
amendments proposed by the House, such a dismissal would be ap­
propriate if the relator had learned of the facts underlying her alle­
qui tam provision, fearing an increase in the number of False Claims suits. See John 
Mintz, Contractors Target Whistle-Blowers, WASH. POST, May 5,1994 at B11. 
85. S. 841, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). See 139 CONGo REc. S5178 (daily ed. 
Apr. 29, 1993). 
86. S. 841, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3730(b)(6)(A)(i) (1993) (emphasis added). The 
new jurisdictional bar proposed by the Senate would also, with certain exceptions, have 
precluded governmental employees from bringing suit. Id. at § 3730(b)(6)(A)(ii)(I)­
(III). The relevant language of Senate Bill 841 read: 
Section 3730(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end thereof the following new paragraph: 
(6)(A) No later than 60 days after the date of service under paragraph (2), the 
Government may move to dismiss from the action the qui tam relator if ­
(i) all the necessary and specific material allegations contained in such 
action were derived from an open and active fraud investigation by the 
Government; or 
(ii) the person bringing the action learned of the information that under­
lies the alleged violation of section 3729 that is the basis of the action in 
the course of the person's employment by the United States ... . 
Section 3730 of title 31, United States Code, is further amended .. . 
(3) in subsection (e) by striking out paragraph (4). 
Id. 
87. 139 CONGo REc. S5178-79 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1993). 
88. 139 CoNG. REc. H6377 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1993). 
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gations from the news media or a congressional hearing or report.89 
Subsequently, the House and Senate Committees held joint 
hearings on the proposed legislation.90 In his introductory state­
ment to these hearings, Senator Grassley, noting that Senate Bill 
841 was designed to clarify the provisions regarding parasitical law­
suits under the False Claims Act, stated that the jurisdictional bar, 
as written in section 3730(e)(4), had been intended only to exclude 
those suits where the government knew of the allegations of fraud 
and was already prosecuting the case.91 Representative Berman 
noted in these same hearings that House Bill 2915 was essentially 
similar to Senate Bill 841 and that Congress' original purpose in the 
1986 Amendments was "·to create a very narrow exception so as to 
bar qui tam suits only in those instances that could legitimately be 
considered parasitic and where, as a consequence, there would be 
scant, if any, public interest in rewarding the qui tam [sic] 
plaintiff."92 
89. H.R. 2915, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3730(b)(6)(A)(i)(I), (II), (1993). The rele­
vant language of House Bill 2915 is as follows: 
Section 3730(b) of title 31, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
end thereof the following new paragraph: 
(6)(A) No later than 60 days after the date of service under paragraph (2), the 
Government may move to dismiss from the action the person bringing the 
action if ­
(i) such person first learned all the necessary and specific facts underlying 
the material allegations contained in the action from ­
(I) a fraud investigation that the executive branch of the Government 
is actively pursuing, or 
(II) a news media report or a congressional hearing or report, if the 
executive branch of the Government, before such person filed the 
complaint in the action, commenced a fraud investigation of such al­
legations on the basis of such facts, and if the executive branch is 
actively pursuing such investigation; or 
(ii) such person learned of the information that underlies the alleged vio­
lation of section 3729 that is the basis of the action in the course of the 
person's employment by the United States .... 
Section 3730 of title 31, United States Code, is amended ... (3) in subsection 
(e) by striking out paragraph (4). 
Id. 
90. The False Claims Amendments Act of 1993: Hearing on S. 841 Before the 
Subcomm. on Couns and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Hearing]. See 139 CoNG. REc. D951 (daily 
ed. Sept. 9, 1993). 
91. 1993 Hearing, supra note 90, at 3. 
92. Id. at 6 (statement of Rep. Howard Berman, sponsor of House Bill 2915). 
The bottom line is that if the executive branch of the government is not ac­
tively pursuing the fraud alleged in the qui tam complaint, whatever its deriva­
tion, an invaluable purpose is served when the resources of the qui tam 
plaintiff and counsel are applied to the pursuit of alleged wrongdoing. 
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The statements of both Representative Berman and Senator 
Grassley, co-sponsors of the 1986 Amendments, in the 1993 Hear­
ings indicate that the intention of the "original source" provision in 
the 1986 Amendments was only to preclude suits based on ongoing 
governmental investigations such as those in Hess.93 According to 
Representative Berman and Senator Grassley, the 1986 Amend­
ments were not intended to require that the original source, in addi­
tion to having direct and independent knowledge, be the original 
source to the disclosing entity. Thus, the "whistle-blower" require­
ment, imposed by the Second Circuit in United States ex rei. Dick v. 
Long Island Lighting Co. and by the Ninth Circuit in Wang ex rei. 
United States v. FMC Corp., did not reflect the original intent of 
Congress.94 Despite the committee's clear desire to resolve this 
controversy, the 103d Congress adjourned without taking any legis­
lative action on Senate Bill 841 or House Bill 2915.95 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT IN "ORIGINAL SOURCE" 
In the decisions handed down since the passage of the 1986 
Amendments to the Act, the federal courts of appeals have been 
split in their interpretation of the "original source" provision of sec­
tion 3730(e)(4). Their varied interpretations have revolved around 
whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a qui tam suit 
where the information upon which the plaintiff's suit is based has 
been pUblidy disclosed. Under section 3730(e)(4), a plaintiff in 
such circumstances may maintain her suit if she qualifies as an 
"original source."96 The federal courts of appeals have split as to 
what requirements a qui tam plaintiff must satisfy in order to be 
considered an "original source." 
A. Original Source: Direct and Independent "Plus" 
Two circuits, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sec-
Id. at 9 (prepared statement of Rep. Berman). 
93. 1993 Hearing, supra note 90, at 3, 6; see also United States ex reL Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of Hess. See supra part I.A for a discussion of the 1986 amendments. 
94. 1993 Hearing, supra note 90, at 3, 6. Interestingly, Lisa Hovelson, testifying at 
the Hearing as a representative of Taxpayers Against Fraud, noted that a significant 
problem with the application of § 3730(e)(4) was the tendency of the courts to consider 
"virtually any utterance to be a 'public disclosure.'" Id. at 22. See supra notes 59-62 for 
a discussion of the "publicly disclosed" test of § 3730(e)(4)(A). 
95. Search of LEXIS, Billtrack Library, Senate file (Nov. 1, 1994). 
96. § 3730(e)(4)(A). See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for a com­
plete discussion of the original source language in § 3730(e)(4). 
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ond and Ninth Circuits, have attempted to resolve the ambiguity 
present in section 3730(e)(4) by adding an additional requirement, 
a "plus," to the statutory standard of "direct and independent."97 
These two circuits require that the original source must be a "whis­
tle-blower": in addition to having direct and independent knowl­
edge of the previously disclosed information, these circuits hold 
that the qui tam plaintiff must also have been the source of that 
information to the entity that released the information.98 For exam­
ple, under the rationale of the Second and Ninth Circuits, if Jones is 
aware that fraud was committed against the government by the 
ABC Company, and a newspaper article has reported of fraud com­
mitted against the government by ABC, Jones cannot maintain a 
qui tam suit against ABC unless she has both direct and independ­
ent knowledge of the fraud, apart from the information disclosed in 
the newspaper report. Additionally, she must be the individual who 
originally told the newspaper about the fraud. Accordingly, the 
standard employed in the Second and Ninth Circuits is direct and 
independent knowledge, "plus" the added requirement that the qui 
tam plaintiff be the actual whistleblower.99 
Each of the two circuits that use "direct and independent plus" 
as the standard for determining whether a relator qualifies as an 
original source arrived at its conclusion by way of a slightly differ­
ent path.loo In United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting 
Company ("LILCO"), the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit held that a qui tam plaintiff whose complaint was 
based upon publicly disclosed information must have "directly or 
indirectly been a source to the entity that publicly disclosed the alle­
gations. "101 The court of appeals in LILCO held that the qui tarn 
plaintiffs had based their suit on information disclosed in a prior 
RICO lawsuit against LILCO by the County of Suffolk, and that 
they had not been the source of the information upon which Suffolk 
had based its allegations. According to the Second Circuit, the lan­
97. See infra note 112 for a discussion of the "direct and independent" standard. 
98. See infra notes 100-109 and accompanying text. 
99. Id. 
100. See infra notes 101-110 and accompanying text for a discussion of United 
States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990) and Wang ex 
reI. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992). 
101. LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs in LlLCO were 
mid· level managers at a nuclear power station who filed suit against a lighting company, 
charging that it had lied about the construction status of the power station to obtain 
higher rates and thereby defrauded the United States, which was the ratepayer. Id. at 
14. 
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guage and legislative history of the 1986 Amendments required that 
"a qui tam suit be based on information not then publicly disclosed, 
unless disclosed, directly or indirectly, by the person bringing the 
suit."102 The court believed that this additional requirement would 
encourage potential plaintiffs to report information before it was 
publicly disclosed and would end what the court termed a "conspir­
acy of silence" that fostered fraud against the govemment.1°3 The 
LILCO court based its conclusion on what it termed a "close tex­
tual analysis combined with a review of the legislative history."l04 
Subsequently, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit ruled on the "original source" provision in section 
3730(e)(4) in a decision that concurred with the Second Circuit's 
102. Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added). 
103. Id. at 18. 
104. Id. at 17. The relevant text of § 3730(e)(4) reads as follows: 

(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based 

upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or 

administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Ac­

counting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me­

dia, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person 

bringing the action is an original source of the information. 

(B) For purposes of this paragraph, "original source" means an individual who 

has direct and independent knowledge of the information on which the allega­

tions are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the Govern­

ment before filing an action under this section which is based on the 

information. 
§ 3730(e)(4) (emphasis added). The LILCO court focused on Congress' use of the 
word "information" in sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and (e)(4)(B) and concluded that the 
same word actually had different meanings in each section. The court found that "in­
formation" was intended to mean "the information that was publicly disclosed" in sec­
tion (e)(4)(A) and "that which supplies the basis for the qui tam action itself" in 
(e)(4)(B), "a slightly more expansive definition." LILCO, 912 F.2d at 16-17. "Such a 
slight difference in meaning assumes importance because it permits the interpretation 
that § (4)(B) does not contain the exclusive requirements in order for one to be an 
'original source' and that an additional requirement is to be found in § (4)(A)." Id. at 
17. See Robert L. Vogel, Eligibility Requirements for Relators Under Qui Tam Provi­
sions of the False Claims Act, 21 PuB. CONT. L.J. 593,601-04 (1992). 
This construction of the jurisdictional bar was also followed in 1993 by the Second 
Circuit in United States ex reL Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Technologies Corp., 985 
F.2d 1148, 1158 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2962 (1993), although the court in 
Kreindler never specifically addressed the additional requirement of "original source to 
the disclosing entity." Id. at 1158-59. The court in Kreindler held that the plaintiff did 
not have direct and independent knowledge of the allegations in the complaint and 
therefore was not qualified as an original source. Id. at 1159. See also United States ex 
rei. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 870 F. Supp. 457 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (adopting the rea­
soning of Kreindler). 
See also infra notes 213-227 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fourth 
Circuit's dismissal of this line of reasoning in United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dick­
inson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994). 
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holding in LILCO.105 The qui tam plaintiff in Wang ex rei. United 
States v. FMC Corp. was an engineer who had direct and independ­
ent knowledge of alleged fraud committed by his employer in a de­
fense contract, fraud that had been previously publicly disclosed 
and upon which Wang had based his complaint. lo6 However, the 
court in Wang found that, because the plaintiff had not been the 
individual who had publicly disclosed the allegations, the court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section 3730(e)(4).107 
Agreeing with the Second Circuit's holding in LILCO, the Wang 
court reviewed both textual arguments and legislative history. lOB 
The court concluded that the purpose of the amendments to the 
Act was to encourage private individuals with knowledge of fraud 
against the government to come forward and that qui tam jurisdic­
tion was therefore only appropriate for those who had been instru­
mental in the public disclosure of the allegations upon which the 
suits were based.109 Although Wang's knowledge was not parasitic 
in nature, his suit was barred because he was not the "whistle­
105. Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992). See 
Kaner, supra note 40. 
106. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1417. 
107. Id. at 1420. 
108. Id. at 1418. 
109. Id. The court held that if "someone republishes an allegation that already 
has been publicly disclosed, he cannot bring a qui tam suit, even if he had 'direct and 
independent knowledge' of the fraud. He is no 'whistle-blower.' A 'whistle-blower' 
sounds the alarm; he does not echo it." [d. at 1419. 
See also United States ex rei. Barajas v. Northrop Corp., 5 F.3d 407, 411 (9th Cir. 
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994) (an original source must have played some 
part, direct or indirect, in the public disclosure of allegations in false claims suit); 
United States ex reL Fine v. Univ. of Cal., 821 F. Supp. 1356, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1993), 
rev'd, remanded sub nom. United States ex rei. Fine v. Chevron, 39 F.3d 97 (9th Cir. 
1994), reh'g en banc granted, 60 F.3d 525 (1995) (relator must be original source of 
information as well as direct or indirect source of public disclosure that gave rise to 
jurisdictional bar). Significantly, the court in Barajas took note of the language of 
§ 3730(d)(I). Barajas, 5 F.3d at 410. The court noted that "when a qui tam suit ... is 
'based primarily on disclosures of specific information'" for which the plaintiff was not 
an original source, the qui tam plaintiff is limited to 10% of the recovery by 
§ 3730(d)(I). [d. (quoting 31 U.S.c. § 3730(d)(I) (emphasis added) (citations omit­
ted». Thus, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges that § 3730(d)(I) of the Act contemplates 
a set of circumstances where information upon which the original source has based her 
lawsuit is not wholly original. § 3730(d)(I). See infra notes 236-240 for a discussion of 
§ 3730(d)(I) and its implications for the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(4). 
Of tangential interest is the fact that California passed its own state false claims 
statute in 1992. BOESE, supra note 2, at 4-13 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12650 et seq. 
West 1992) ("The California False Claims Act"». Although the California False Claims 
Act is quite similar in many respects to the federal Act, it specifically grants qui tam 
jurisdiction only where the qui tam plaintiff has provided his information to the disclos­
ing entity. [d. at 4-14 (citing CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12652(d)(3)(b». 
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blower."110 
B. Original Source: Direct and Independent as the Standard 
A second group of courts of appeals have held that a qui tam 
plaintiff qualifies as an "original source" if she simply has direct and 
independent knowledge of the information that was publicly dis~ 
closed.111 Although the reasoning of these courts of appeals is not 
always consistent and the definitions of "direct and independent" 
sometimes vary,112 a majority of these courts have found the stat­
ute's requirement of direct and independent knowledge to be suffi­
cient, and, when ruling after the Second and Ninth Circuit's 
imposition of a "whistle-blower" requirement, have expressly re­
jected their line of reasoning.113 
In one of the first cases to wrestle with the interpretation of the 
"original source" provision of section 3730(e)(4), the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied the direct and 
independent standard. The court found that the trial court had 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the information upon 
which the relator's claim was based had been publicly disclosed,114 
110. Wang, 975 F.2d at 1420. "While Wang was silent, some other conscientious 
... person bravely brought the ... problems to the attention of the media and the 
Army. If there is to be a bounty for disclosing those troubles, it should go to one who in 
fact helped to bring them to light." Id. The Wang court, however, did note that all 
those who either directly or indirectly disclosed an allegation might qualify as its origi­
nal source. Id. at 1419. See United States ex rei. Fine v. Univ. of Cal., 821 F. Supp. 
1356, 1360 (N.D. Cal. 1993), rev'd, remanded sub nom. United States ex reL Fine v. 
Chevron, 39 F.3d 97 (9th Cir. 1994), reh'g en bane granted, 60 F.3d 525 (1995) (plaintiff 
who helped report allegations of fraud to government before public disclosure "directly 
or indirectly" disclosed such allegations). See also United States ex reL Fine v. MK­
Ferguson Co., 861 F. Supp. 1544 (D.N.M. 1994) (agreeing with the reasoning of the 
Second and Ninth Circuits). 
111. See United States ex rei. Barth v. Ridgedale Electric, Inc., 44 F.3d 699 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (declining to rule on the question of whether the relator must also prove he 
was a source of the infonnation to the entity that publicly disclosed the pertinent infor­
mation as required by the Second and Ninth Circuits). 
112. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, a qui 
tam plaintiff has direct knowledge of fraud when the infonnation is obtained without 
benefit of any intennediate source, "marked by an absence of intervening agency." 
United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3d Cir. 1991). 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has held that independent 
knowledge is acquired when the relator does not learn of the infonnation through pub­
lic disclosure or through the government. Houck ex rei. United States v. Folding Car­
ton Admin. Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, and 
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 (1990). 
113. See supra notes 101-110 and accompanying text. 
114. See supra notes 59-62 for a discussion of the "based upon/publicly disclosed" 
threshold test. . 
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and that there was no evidence that the qui tam plaintiff would 
have learned about the information without that public 
disclosure.115 
In Houck ex rei. United States v. Folding Carton Administrative 
Committee, the plaintiff worked with individuals who were claim­
ants to a settlement agreement and assisted them in filing claims to 
recover money from the settlement fund.116 In dismissing the plain­
. tiff's claim, the Houck court interpreted the 1986 Amendments to 
the Act as barring an action by a qui tam plaintiff which had been 
based solely on publicly disclosed transactions.H7 Although the 
court found that Houck had "direct knowledge" through his assist­
ance to the settlement fund claimants, the court determined that 
Houck would not have learneq of the claims to the settlement fund 
without public disclosure and therefore did not have the "'direct 
and independent'" knowledge required of an "original source."118 
Thus, the court relied on its interpretation of the phrase "direct and 
independent" in the statute to determine whether it lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction for plaintiff's suit.119 
United States ex rei. Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Insur­
ance Co.,12° decided shortly after Houck, was the first in a line of 
cases brought under the False Claims Act by a law firm that, 
through its representation of Mr. Leonard, a victim of an automo­
bile accident, had become aware of alleged Medicare fraud by sev­
eral insurance companies.121 The Stinson firm concluded from its 
research in the Leonard litigation that Provident's claim processing 
practices violated federal law by allowing Medicare to pay as pri­
mary insurer for the benefit claims of working seniors.122 Subse­
115. Houck, 881 F.2d at 505. 
116. Id. at 503. 
117. Id. at 504. 
118. Id. at 505 (quoting § 3730(e)(4)(B». 
119. Id. 
120. 721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
121. Id. at 1248. The Stinson cases were all based upon an incriminating Provi­
dent memo that the Stinson law firm obtained during discovery in the Leonard litiga­
tion. In the memo, handwritten notations indicated that other insurance companies 
handled claims in the same, allegedly improper, manner that formed the basis for the 
lawsuit against Provident. United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 
1149, 1151 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing United States ex. rel. Stinson v. Provident Life & Acci­
dent Ins. Co., 7.21 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States ex reL Stinson v. Blue 
Cross Blue Shield, 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990); United States ex rel. Stinson et al. 
v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., No. C-90-29-G, 1991 WL 210855 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 1991); United 
States ex rel. Stinson v. Pan American Life Ins. Co., No. 90-411, 1992 WL 125329 (E.D. 
La. May 22, 1992». 
122. Provident, ·721 F. Supp. at 1248. Stinson alleged that Provident had de­
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quently, the Stinson law. firm filed a qui tam action against 
Provident under the ACt.123 Provident moved to dismiss for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction under section 3730(e)(4).124 
Declining to rule on the "publicly disclosed" test,125 the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida moved di­
rectly to the determination of whether the Stinson firm had "direct 
and independent" knowledge of Provident's alleged fraudulent 
practices.126 The court held that the information obtained by the 
Stinson firm could be characterized as "direct" because Stinson was 
not a "disinterested outsider" who had "simply stumble[d] across 
an interesting court file."127 Stinson's information was also "in­
dependent," according to the court, because it had obtained infor­
mation to support its qui tam action from sources other than the 
Leonard litigation. l28 Accordingly, the court found that Stinson 
qualified as an "original source" under sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and 
(B).129 
The Leonard litigation, however, led the Stinson firm to file 
additional qui tam suits.130 Through its investigation of Provident's 
allegedly fraudulent claims practices, Stinson had obtained two in­
ternal Provident memoranda that indicated that other insurance 
companies, including the Prudential Life Insurance Company, had 
followed the same allegedly fraudulent processing practices utilized 
by Provident.131 The Stinson law firm subsequently pursued this 
cause of action against these other insurance companies, filing 
claims under the Act which were based on this information ob­
frauded the government "by shifting ... responsibility for payment of insurance claims 
to Medicare and the private sector despite Provident's knowledge and understanding of 
its obligations under section 116(a) of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 
1982 ('TEFRA')." Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See supra notes 59-62 for a discussion of the "based upon/publicly disclosed" 
standard. 
126. Provident, 721 F. Supp. at 1257. 
127. Id. at 1258 (citing United States ex rei. Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. 
Comm., 881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, and cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1027 (1990». 
128. Id. at 1257. 
129. Id. 
130. See, e.g., United States ex. reL Stinson v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 
721 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Fla. 1989); United States ex rei. Stinson v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Ins., 755 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. Ga. 1990). 
131. United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential, 944 F.2d 1149, 1151 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
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tained during the Leonard lawsuit against Provident,132 
Subsequent to the decision of the district court for the South­
ern District of Florida, however, one of these subsequent false 
claims suits filed by the Stinson firm was held to be barred by sec­
tion 3730(e)(4). In United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Insur­
ance Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
held that, in this instance, Stinson was not an "original source" be­
cause its suit against Prudential was based exclusively on informa­
tion contained in the Provident memoranda, which had been 
"previously disclosed" in the Leonard litigation.133 The court as­
serted that" 'direct' is marked by absence of an intervening agency, 
instrumentality, or intluence."134 Since Stinson's information about 
Prudential's claims processing had come via Provident memoranda 
produced through discovery instead of through a direct investiga­
tion of Prudential's processing methods, the court found that the 
law firm's information was not "direct" under section 3730(e)(4),135 
In dismissing the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, how­
ever, the Third Circuit noted that, although the "paradigmatic 'orig­
inal source' is a whistle-blowing irisider ... [o]ther relators may also 
qualify if their information results from their own investiga­
tions."136 While recognizing Congress' desire to encourage actions 
by legitimate "whistle-blowers," the court in Prudential did not find 
it necessary to impose an extra-textual requirement in order to dis­
miss the qui tam plaintiff's action under section 3730(e)(4).137 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fol­
lowed Provident in United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus­
tries, Inc. 138 In Precision, the plaintiff, a corporation, had filed suit 
under the Act alleging that the defendant had understated the 
quantity of crude oil and natural gas produced from federal and 
Indian land, thereby defrauding the federal government of mineral 
royalties,139 The defendants challenged the court's subject matter 
132. Id. at 1150. 
133. Id. at 1152. See supra notes 120-129 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of the Leonard litigation. 
134. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1160 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNA­
TIONAL DICfIONARY 640 (1976». 
135. Id. at 1160-61. 
136. Id. at 1161. Significantly, the dissent, in an opinion that retraced much of the 
same legislative history used by the majority to support its opinion, concluded that suits 
such as the one filed against Prudential by Stinson were not intended to be barred by 
the 1986 amendments. Id. at 1171 (Scirica, J., dissenting) 
137. Id. at 1661. 
138. 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993). 
139. Id. at 550. 
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jurisdiction, claiming that Precision's complaint was partially based 
on information that had been publicly disclosed in "numerous news 
releases. "140 
The court in Precision held that suits filed by the corporation's 
president, together with congressional hearings and press releases, 
constituted public disclosure for the purposes of section 
3730(e)(4)(A).141 Further, as the corporate qui tam plaintiff had 
not come into existence until after the disclosure took place, it 
could not qualify as an original source, even though its employees 
had subsequently collected additional information used in the 
suit.142 Therefore, the court held, Precision's suit was barred by 
section 3730( e)( 4).143 
In deciding the question of whether Precision had been an 
"original source," the Tenth Circuit noted that the "[t]wo jurisdic­
tional requirements [of § 3730(e)(4)(B)] ... are plain, unambiguous 
and require no further scrutiny."l44 
In 1994, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Cir­
cuit faced the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(e)(4).14S The plain­
tiff in United States ex rei. Springfield Terminal Railway v. Quinn 
("Quinn") was a railway company that brought suit under the False 
Claims Act against an arbitrator appointed to resolve a labor dis­
pute between the railway and its union,146 Initially, the company's 
attention had been drawn to fraudulent billing by the arbitrator 
through its inspection of documents which were produced by civil 
discovery in a prior suit,147 The company subsequently conducted 
additional investigation which revealed extensive fraudulent billing 
of the government by the arbitrator. l48 
140. Id. at 551, 554. Interpreting a key provision of § 3730(e}(4}(A}, the court 
held that the phrase "based upon" can be interpreted to mean "supported by." Id. at 
552. Significantly, the court, while professing respect for the plain meaning of the stat­
ute, offered no attributiori for this definition. Id. 
141. Id. at 553. 
142. Id. at 553-54. 
143. Id. at 554. 
144. Id. at 553. In this opinion, decided after the Second Circuit's imposition of 
an additional "whistle-blower" requirement in United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island 
Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990), the court specifically declined to read any 
additional requirement into the "original source" language of the statute. Id. 
145. United States ex reL Springfield Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). 
146. Id. at 647. 
147. Id. at 647-48. 
148. Id. The arbitrator had indicated on his bills to the federal government that 
he had worked on certain days when, according to the company, he had not been work­
ing on the railway company's dispute on those days. Id. at 648. 
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The lower court in Quinn had reasoned that the company's 
claim was "based upon" material unearthed during discovery in the 
previous litigation and thus was "publicly disclosed."149 Since the 
information was obtained through an intermediary, the district 
court had held that the information was not "direct and independ­
ent," and therefore the plaintiff was not an "original source" under 
section 3730(e)(4).150 The D.C. Circuit disagreed, however, and 
provided a detailed theoretical analysis of the "based upon publicly 
disclosed" test in section 3730( e)( 4)(A), the threshold test for "orig­
inal source," to determine if the materials that formed the basis of 
the company's suit were "in the public eye" and therefore at risk of 
"parasitism."151 The court of appeals interpreted the 1986 amend­
ments as having created a standard under which the "original 
source" inquiry only need be reached if there is sufficient informa­
tion in the public domain to expose either the fraudulent transac­
tion or the allegation of fraud.152 
Extending its analysis to its determination of "original source," 
the Quinn court held that, since the relator is not required to pos­
sess direct and independent knowledge of all of the vital compo­
nents to a fraudulent transaction, the relator need only have 
knowledge of either the fraudulent transaction or the allegation of 
fraud in order to qualify as an original source.153 Because the infor­
mation gleaned from discovery in the suit to set aside the union 
settlement was not sufficient, in and of itself, to indicate fraud, the 
company's additional knowledge of the arbitration proceedings and 
its subsequent investigation gave it sufficient direct and independ­
ent information to allow it to be considered an "original source" 
149. Id. at 652. 
150. [d. at 648-49. 
151. Id. at 653-54. The court developed a fonnula in which X + Y = Z, where Z 
represented the allegation of fraud and X and Y represented its essential elements. Id. 
at 654. "In order to disclose the fraudulent transaction publicly, the combination of X 
and Y must be revealed, from which readers ... may infer Z, i.e., the conclusion that 
fraud has been committed." Id. 
152. [d. at 651. In the language of the D.C. Circuit's fonnula, when X by itself is 
in the public domain, there is insufficient infonnation to bar the qui tam suit. However, 
if X and Yare publicly disclosed, or if Z is disclosed, there is little need for a qui tam 
action.· Id. at 654. The court acknowledged that "[w]hen ... some infonnation relied 
upon by the qui tam plaintiff is undeniably in the public domain, the task of ensuring 
that qui tam suits are limited to those in which the relator has contributed significant 
independent infonnation can prove tricky." Id. at 653. 
153. Id. at 657. "'[D]irect and independent knowledge of infonnation on which 
the allegations are based' refers to direct and independent knowledge of any essential 
element of the underlying fraud ...." Id. at 657. 
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within the meaning of section 3730(e)(4)(B).154 
The court in Quinn based its understanding of the jurisdic­
tional bar on what it determined to be the purpose of the frequently 
amended Act: "Seeking the golden mean between adequate incen­
tives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable informa­
tion and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no 
significant information to contribute of their own. "155 The court 
concluded that "[t]he goal of avoiding suits that merely drain the 
public fiSC156 is amply advanced by a construction of 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A) that bars suit only when specific allegations of 
fraud or the vital ingredients to a fraudulent transaction exist in the 
public eye. "157 Although clearly concerned with blocking parasitic 
suits, the Quinn court did not impose the LILCO or Wang require­
ment that the qui tam plaintiff be a "whistle-blower" in order to 
qualify as an "original source."158 By shifting the focus of its in­
quiry to the "based upon/publicly disclosed" test of section 
3730(e)(4)(A), the court in Quinn found it "unnecessary" to decide 
whether the relator must additionally have been responsible for the 
public disclosure of the fraud upon which his suit was based.159 
Two months later, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit firmly rejected the requirement, imposed by the 
courts in LILCO and Wang, that the relator be the source of the 
publicly disclosed information to the disclosing entity ("direct and 
independent plus").I60 The qui tam plaintiff in United States ex rei. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 649. . 
156. . A "fisc" is defined as a state or royal treasury. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COL· 
LEGIATE DlcrIONARY 439 (1993). 
157. Quinn. 14 F.3d at 657 (emphasis added). 
158. Id. at 656-57. 
159. Although it was clearly aware of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wang ex reL 
United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992), the Quinn court never even 
mentioned the "whistle-blower" requirement in its discussion of "original source." 
Quinn, 14 F.3d at 651, 653,656-57 (citing Wang, 975 F.2d at 1416, 1418). The "factual 
posture" of the case rendered this decision "unnecessary." Id. at 657 n.12 (citing Wang, 
975 F.2d at 1418; United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13, 16­
17 (2d Cir. 1990». "Springfiel" would in any event satisfy [this requirement] without 
question." Id. Significantly, the D.C. Circuit's formula for determining whether a rela­
tor's suit was "based upon publicly disclosed" material narrows the reading of this 
threshold test and enables a false claims suit to move forward if the relator has based 
her action on material which is only partially in the public domain. Id. at 653-56. This 
restriction of the formerly broadly read "quick trigger test" offers additional protection 
against the parasitic suits that were the target of the Second and Ninth Circuits when 
they imposed their "whistle-blower" requirement on § 3730(e)(4) and may result in 
fewer tests of the "original source" provision of the jurisdictional bar. 
160. United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1351-53 
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Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co. was employed by a distributor of 
health care products.161 In a previous state court lawsuit, the dis­
tributor had claimed its distributorship agreement had been can­
celed because the manufacturer of the health care products feared 
disclosure of its practice of overcharging the government.162 After 
the suit concerning the distributorship agreement was settled, the 
qui tam plaintiff filed a suit against the manufacturer under the Act, 
asserting that he originally learned of the manufacturer's fraudulent 
practices through independent investigation undertaken during his 
employment and not as a result of the previous litigation.163 
In dismissing the plaintiff's suit for lack of subject matter juris­
diction, the district court had adopted the standard set forth by the 
Second Circuit in LILCO. The district court found that the distrib­
utor was the entity that had publicly disclosed the allegations and 
that, since Siller was not the source of those allegations, he was not 
the "original source," even though he might have had "direct and 
independent knowledge" of the information.164 The court of ap­
peals reversed the district court and rejected the logic of the Second 
Circuit on this issue, holding that the requirement that a relator 
must also be a source to the disclosing entity was "not merely un­
persuasive, but implausible. "165 
The Siller court also discussed the Ninth Circuit's accord in 
Wang ex rei. United States v. FMC Corp . .166 The court in Siller con­
cluded that the Ninth Circuit in Wang actually had rejected the 
LILCO court's statutory analysis, while purporting to adopt its in­
terpretation of "original source. "167 The Siller court further con­
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994) (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16; Wang, 975 
F.2d at 1418). 
161. Id. at 1340-41. 
162. Id. at 134l. 
163. Id. 
164. Id. at 1351. See also United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 
912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990) and supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text. The Siller 
court held that "any information disclosed through civil litigation and on file with the 
clerk's office should be considered a public disclosure of allegations in a civil hearing 
for purposes of section 3730(e)(4)(A)." Siller, 21 F.3d at 1350. As such, the informa­
tion in the SSI complaint was publicly disclosed. Id. at 1351. See also supra notes 59-62 
for a discussion of the "based upon/publicly disclosed" standard. 
165. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351 (citing LILCO, 912 F.2d at 16-17). See supra notes 
100-104 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Second Circuit's holding in 
LILCO. See also infra notes 213-227 for a complete discussion of the Fourth Circuit's 
analysis of the LILCO decision. See also Vogel, supra note 104, at 601-04. 
166. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1353 (citing Wang ex reL United States v. FMC Corp., 975 
F.2d 1412, 1418 (9th Cir. 1992). 
167. Id. 
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cluded that the statutory requirement of "direct and independent" 
was sufficient to prevent parasitic suits and that the additional re­
quirement that the qui tam plaintiff be a "whistle-blower" imposed 
a criterion not intended by Congress.168 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is the most re­
cent court to wrestle with the question of whether a qui tam plain­
tiff must also be a "whistle-blower" in order to maintain jurisdiction 
under the act.169 In Cooper ex rei. United States v. Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield of Florida, Inc.,11° the qui tam plaintiff filed a suit 
under the Act charging his medical insurance company with fraudu­
lent billing practices.171 Even though the qui tam plaintiff had noti­
fied members of Congress and a federal agency of his allegations, 
the Eleventh Circuit held that, because Cooper had acquired his 
knowledge of the alleged wrongdoing through years of researching 
claims, he therefore had direct knowledge obtained independently 
of any disclosed allegations.172 The court noted that the original 
source inquiry was designed to be the focus of the Act's jurisdic­
tional provisions and held that the plaintiff fulfilled the require­
ments of an "original source."173 
168. Id. at 1355. See also infra notes 228-235 and accompanying text for a com­
plete discussion of the Fourth Circuit's analysis of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Wang. 
169. Cooper ex reL United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d 562 
(11th Cir. 1994). Since the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Cooper, the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the FIrst and Eighth Circuits have also dealt with the issue of 
"original source" and the jurisdictional bar in § 3730(e)(b)(4). United States ex reL 
LeBlanc v. Raytheon Co., 874 F. Supp. 35 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 62 F.3d 1411 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(qui tam relator's action barred because plaintiff actually derived allegations from pub­
lic disclosure); United States ex reL Barth v. Ridgedale Electric, Inc., 44 F.3d 699 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (qui tam plaintiff must have independent and direct knowledge to satisfy 
subject matter jurisdiction; "We do not reach the question whether the relator must also 
satisfy a third requirement [whistle-blower] ... as detennined by the Second and Ninth 
Circuits."); see also United States ex reL Rabushka v. Crane Co., 40 F.3d 1509 (8th Cir. 
1994), cerL denied 115 S. Ct. 2579 (1995) (narrowing the based upon/publicly disclosed 
test to avoid the "original source" inquiry). In addition, the District Court for the East­
ern District of Louisiana has ruled that a private plaintiff is not an original source under 
the statute where it did not come into existence until after public disclosure. United 
States ex reL Federal Recovery Services, Inc. v. Crescent City EMS, Inc., No. 91-4150, 
1993 WL 345655 (E.D. La. Aug. 30, 1993), reh'g denied by United States v. Crescent 
City EMS, Inc., No-4150, 1994 WL 518171 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 1994). 
170. 19 F.3d 562 (11th Cir. 1994). 
171. Id. at 564. 
172. Id. at 568. 
173. Id. at 568 n.10 (citing United States ex reL Precision v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 
F.2d 548, 552 (10th Cir. 1992), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993». See also False 
Claims Act Implementation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Gov. 
Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1990) [hereinaf­
ter 1990 Implementation Hearing). Congress wanted to both encourage citizen involve­
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Citing the Tenth Circuit's holding in Precision, the Cooper 
court noted that the "based upon" test was intended to be a "quick 
trigger" test, forcing inquiry forward to the more exacting standard 
of "original source."174 The court specifically rejected the Second 
Circuit's holding in LILCO requiring the relator to prove he was 
the original source of the information to the disclosing entityP5 
The Cooper court found no support for this rule in the plain lan­
guage or in the legislative history, noting that "[t]his requirement 
would impose a tough burden on the relator and could discourage 
citizen involvement; even when the citizen has direct and independ­
ent knowledge of fraud."176 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
While rejecting what it termed to be a flawed analysis of legis­
lative history by the Second and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit, 
in United States ex rei Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., pointed out 
a fundamental problem with many of the decisions in which other 
courts of appeals have attempted to apply the jurisdictional bar in 
section 3730(e)(4).177 Citing the Third Circuit in United States ex 
rei. Stinson v. Prudential Insurance Co. and its attempt to glean the 
true meaning of the statute from the "principal intent" of the legis­
lation, the Fourth Circuit warned that it was 
[E]specially inappropriate (not to mention frighteningly treacher­
ous) to attempt, as these courts have done, to distill from such 
broad, generalized objectives, the answers to the kind of specific 
statutory questions that we herein address; fine calibrations are 
just not possible through the use of such crude instruments. This 
is particularly so in this context, given that, although we can per­
haps divine from these abstract purposes a congressional inten­
tion to balance the need to encourage qui tam actions against the 
need to prevent parasitic suits, we can discern virtually nothing as 
to precisely how Congress ultimately believed it achieved that 
balance. If the language of law is to have any meaning at all, 
then surely it must prevail over the kind of speculation that is 
entailed in such an enterprise as these courts have undertaken.178 
ment and prevent parasitical suits. "[T]he resolution of this question rests on how the 
law's 'original source' doctrine will be interpreted." Id. (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
174. Cooper, 19 F.3d at 568 n.10 (citing Precision, 971 F.2d at 552). 
175. Id. at 568 n.13. 
176. Id. 
177. United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1351-54 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994). 
178. Id. at 1354-55 (citing United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 
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A. Statutory Construction 
The final section of the Fourth Circuit's opInIon in Siller 
strongly emphasizes the "language of the law" and warns against 
the imprecise use of legislative history in statutory construction.179 
The proper use of legislative history in statutory construction has 
long troubled the courts.180 The foundation of a democracy rests on 
the separation of powers; with this in mind, the unelected judiciary 
frequently feels pressure to take the expectations of the legislature 
into consideration when interpreting statutes.181 Nonetheless, there 
has been considerable debate over the proper emphasis to place 
upon legislative history in statutory construction and which forms 
of legislative history are most useful.182 Text is concededly the pre­
ferred starting point in statutory construction, and textual argu­
ments are frequently persuasive.183 The language of a statute can 
F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991». See also Robert J. Araujo, S.J., The Use of Legislative 
History in Statutory Interpretation: A Look at Regents v. Bakke, 16 SETON' HALL 
LEGIS. J. 57 (1992). 
[S]ome elements of the legislative history of a statute can conflict with other 
components. One part of legislative history supporting one view can be offset 
by another element of it.... [F]or each element of legislative history support­
ing one view, there often exists an equal, but opposite supporting a conflicting 
view.... These problems should not, however, automatically eliminate consid­
eration of legislative history from the interpretive process. . 
Id. at 145. 
179. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1354-55. Justice Stevens, in a 1992 article, suggested that 
statutory construction fundamentally rests on the following canons, which should be 
evaluated in sequence: (1) Read the statute, i.e., look to the plain meaning of the lan­
guage of the statute; (2) Read the entire statute; (3) Read the statute in its contempo­
rary context; (4) If ambiguity persists, consult the legislative history; (5) Avoid an 
interpretation that would produce absurd results. See Justice John.Paul Stevens, The 
Shakespeare Canon of Statutory Construction, 140 V. PA. L. REv. 1373 (1992). 
180. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 V.C.L.A. L. REv. 621, 624 
(1990) (complete discussion of the various theories of statutory construction as inter­
preted by the Supreme Court). See also Jane Ellen Warner, Environmental Law-The 
Household Waste Exclusion Clarification: 42 U.S.c. § 6921 (i): Did Congress Intend to 
Exclude Municipal Solid Waste Ash from Regulation As Hazardous Waste Under Subti­
tle C?, 16 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 149, 167-175 (1994). 
181. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Prac­
tical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 324 (1990). See also Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legisla­
tive History and the Interpretation ofStatutes: Toward a Fact-Finding Model ofStatutory 
Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REv. 1295, 1300 (1990). 
182. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 324. 
183. Id. at 354. This reflects a view that it is the language of the law alone that has 
been approved by the legislature and signed by the President, and that legislative 
supremacy therefore dictates that an interpreter P3Y close attention to the text of the 
statute. Id. "The beginning, and usually the end, of statutory interpretation should be 
the apparent meaning of the statutory language." Id. at 340. See also Antonin Scalia, 
The Rule of Laws as a Law of Rules, 56 V. Ou. L. REv. 1175 (1989). 
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totally control statutory interpretation, however, only if the text is 
unambiguous.184 Legislators sometimes purposely leave ambigui­
ties in a statute to build support for its passage, with the under­
standing that courts or agencies will then be charged with its 
interpretation,185 Further, regardless of the spedfic language of the 
statute, the meaning of any text is always influenced by context.186 
And, while it is true that it is only the text of a statute that has the 
formal assent of Congress and the President, it is hard to imagine 
that the President or any member of Congress would have the time 
to carefully read the over 7,000 pages of enacted bills passed in an 
average session of Congress.187 
Another difficulty with accepting the plain language of a stat­
ute as exclusively authoritative lies with authorship. Members of 
Congress rarely draft their own legislation, delegating that responsi­
bility to committee staff, lobbyists, the Office of Legislative Coun­
sel, or accepting recommendations from the executive branch.188 In 
interpreting the plain language of a statute, therefore, courts fre­
quently feel justified in seeking guidance from the legislature that 
enacted the law.189 
In a significant number of cases, the Supreme Court has ap­
plied the "soft" plain meaning rule of statutory construction, which 
allows the court to use legislative history' where the statutory lan­
guage is ambiguous or in direct conflict with congressional intent.190 
In a democratic system ... the general rule of law has special claim to prefer­
ence, since it is the normal product of that branch of government most respon­
sive to the people .... Statutes that are seen as establishing rules of inadequate 
clarity or precision are criticized, on that account, as undemocratic - and, in 
the extreme, unconstitutional' - because they leave too much to be decided 
by persons other than the people's representatives. 
Id. at 1176. 
184. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 341. 
185. Id. at 347. 
186. Id. at 342. 
187. Zeppos, supra note 181, at 1311-12 & n.63. 
188. Id. at 1312-13. For an illustrative analysis of the flaws inherent in the process 
of drafting and passing legislation, see Eric J. Gouvin, Truth in Savings and the Failure 
of Legislative Methodology, 62 U. eIN. L. REv. 1281, 1316-53 (1994). 
189. Araujo, supra note 178, at 123-24, 127. See also Jane S. Schachter, 
Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 
HARV. L. REv. 593,599-60,604-06 (1995). "The role of the court is, in essence, to erase 
its own role - that is, to limit its interpretive work to a fairly mechanical retrieval of 
legislative meaning." Id. at 597. 
190. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 628 (citing, e.g., Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 
(1986); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986); Midatlantic Nat'l 
Bank v. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection,474 U.S. 494 (1986». See also Holder v. Hall, 
114 S. Ct. 2581, 2612 & n.28 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Since the elevation of 
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The danger inherent in this "soft" rule is that virtually any docu­
ment which offers an explanation of a statute can be used in statu­
tory construction to determine congressional intent. 191 This is 
particularly problematic where the court is attempting to recreate 
the intent of the enacting Congress by tracing the eV9lution of the 
statute from early legislative proposals to enactment.192 
Despite the problems inherent in an in-depth search for legisla­
tive history, "in an inquiry toreconstruct Congress' original intent 
or purpose, much of what passes as legislative history is obviously 
relevant."193 However, as the Fourth Circuit noted in United States 
ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., and as the Third Circuit 
observed in United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential, a statute that 
relies too heavily upon legislative history for its meaning is subject 
to a wide variance of interpretations.l94 Therefore, the choice of 
which legislative history to use in interpreting a statute is of para­
mount importance. 
The Supreme Court has determined that the most authoritative 
source of congressional intent is found in committee reports, espe­
cially conference committee reports, which provide insight into the 
intent of those who were responsible for the language of the stat­
ute.195 Sponsor statements are also given substantial weight by the 
Justice Scalia to the bench, the Court has adopted a "harder" plain meaning rule and is 
more reluctant to use legislative history either as confirmation of the plain meaning of 
the statute or as a contradiction of the statute's "apparently plain meaning." Eskridge, 
supra note 180 at 656-57. 
191. Warner, supra note 180, at 170 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 
(1986); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982); Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980». 
192. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 630 (citing, e.g., Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. 
v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237 (1985); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gover­
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984». 
193. Id. at 632. The Supreme Court has identified areas where legislative history 
is useful in statutory construction. Warner, supra note 180, at 170. Where the literal 
interpretation of the statute is in direct conflict with clearly expressed congressional 
intent, a court would be "overreaching" if it failed to consider legislative history. Id. 
(citing Griffin, 458 U.S. at 571). Where a literal interpretation of the statute produces 
an "absurd result," judges must use the statute's legislative history to develop a "ra­
tional construction" of the statute. Id. at 171 (citing Stevens, supra note 179, at 1383). 
Where the statute's language is ambiguous and cannot be interpreted literally, the 
courts must look to legislative history. Id. 
194. United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1354 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Q. 316 (1994); United States ex rei. Stinson V. Prudential, 
944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d Cir. 1991). 
195. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 637. "'A committee report represents the con­
sidered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and 
studying proposed legislation.'" Id. (quoting Zuber V. Allen, 396 U.S. 168,186 (1969». 
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Court when determining legislative intent, unless they are ambigu­
ous and contradicted by floor and hearing colloquy.196 Evidence of 
proposals that have been rejected by Congress is not usually consid­
ered primary legislative history.197 The Court is also wary of testi­
mony in committee hearings and of floor debate, unless the 
discussion is concerned with "precise analyses . . . by the sponsors 
of the proposed laws. "198 
In an application with significance for the statutory interpreta­
tion of section 3730(e)(4), the Supreme Court has indicated that 
congressional acts occurring after the passage of legislation (subse­
quent or post-enactment legislative history) may be accorded 
weight in statutory construction.199 This is especially true where 
Congress has passed a statute to clarify an earlier statute, or a legis­
lative committee has made a post-enactment pronouncement with 
respect to previously enacted legislation~20o Moreover, a pro­
nouncement may be accorded significant .weight when the commit­
tee responsible for the post-enactment report also reported the bill 
that became law, and the Post-ellactment report was issued within 
196. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 637-38. 
"[R]emarks ... of the sponsor of the language ultimately enacted, are an au­
thoritative guide to the statute's construction," because the sponsors are the 
Members of Congress most likely to know what the proposed legislation is all 
about, and other Members can be expected to pay special heed to their charac­
terizations of the legislation. 
Id. at 638 (quoting Northaven Bd. of Educ. ·v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512,526-27 (1982». See 
also National Woodworkers Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S; 612, 640 (1967) ("It is the 
sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in doubt."). But 
see Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1496 n.15 (1994) (debating the 
usefulness of partisan statements by members of COngress). 
197. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 638-39. 
198. Id. at 639 (quoting S & E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 13 
n.9 (1972». 
199. Id. at 635-36 (citing, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 109 S. Ct. 2702, 
2715-17 (1989); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 148-52 (1987); Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 
446 U.S. 657, 666 n.8 (1980». Although subsequent history is usually too ambiguous to 
be useful as legislative history, the Court does occaSionally take it into consideration. 
"'[W]hile the views of subsequent Congresses cannot override the unmistakable intent 
of the enacting one, such views are entitled to significant weight, and particularly so 
when the precise intent of the enacting Congress is obscure.'" Id. at 640 (quoting Sea­
train Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980) (citations omitted». 
But see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 649 (1990) (subse­
quent legislative history forms hazardous basis for determination of congressional in­
tent). See infra notes 241-263 and accompanying text for a discussion of the import of 
subsequent legislative history on the interpretation of § 3730(e)(4). 
200. Warner, supra note 180, at 174 (citing Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 
U.S. 395 (1991); Sioux 1fibe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1942». 
But see United States v. Wise, 370 U.S. 405 (1962). 
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five years of the originallegislation.201 
There are, however, legitimate concerns with the reliability of 
many of these forms of legislative history in statutory construc­
tion.202 The "intent" ascribed to the legislative body is, in fact, the 
collective intent of a group of individuals who each may have had a 
different motive for approving the legislation at hand, and that mo­
tive may have had nothing to do with the legislator's understanding 
of the language of the statute.203 Further, although statements in 
committee reports and the views of the sponsors of the legislation 
are presumed to be representative of the views of the legislature as 
a whole, they are not necessarily representative of the entire Con­
gress.204 As for cleaving to the purpose of the statute, the actual 
"purpose" of the statute may be a hybrid of legislators' responses to 
pressures from special interest groupS.205 
The "original source" provision in section 3730(e)(4) is an ex­
ample of an instance where traditional statutory construction has 
resulted in varying interpretations.206 This may not be surprising 
considering the fact that the "plain language" of the statute is any­
thing butplain, and the legislative history is susceptible to divergent 
interpretation.207 Faced with the challenge of identifying the "true 
meaning" of the original source provision, the circuits that have had 
a recent opportunity to review the jurisdictional bar in section 
3730(e)(4) have attempted to present an approach to the interpre­
tation of the statute that would ensure the application of the bar in 
the manner closest to that intended by Congress.208 A step-by-step 
analysis of statutory construction coupled with a comparison of the 
various circuit decisions suggests not only that an application of the 
201. Warner, supra note 180, at 174 (citing Sioux Tribe, 316 U.S. at 329-30; An­
drus v. Shell Oil Co., 446 U.S. 657, 666 (1980». 
202. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 327. 
203. Id. at 326. 
204. Id. at 327. See also Araujo, supra note 178, at 131 & n.296 (citing Joseph 
Chamberlain, The Courts and Committee Reports, 1 U. CHI. L. REv. 81, 82 (1933». 
205. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 181, at 334-35. The questions that are deter­
minative in evaluating the usefulness of any sort of legislative history are based on the 
relative reliability of the source of the history. Eskridge, supra note 180, at 635. Does 
the source accurately reflect the views of the enacting Congress? Is the source well­
informed? Is there a possibility that either individual members of Congress or groups 
with a particular bias were attempting to "pack" the legislative history to influence 
future judicial review? Id. . 
206. See supra part II for a discussion of the various circuit holdings on the "orig­
inal source" provision. 
207. See, e.g., United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339 
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994). 
208. Id. 
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standard of "direct and independent knowledge" is the best test of 
"original source" in section 3730(e)(4) but also that the imposition 
of a "whistle-blower" requirement is unnecessary to achieve the 
goals of the legislation. This application of the jurisdictional bar is 
the surest way of achieving Congress' dual purposes of encouraging 
private citizens with knowledge of fraud to come forward while pro­
tecting against false claims lawsuits that are truly parasitic in nature. 
Of the recent court of appeals decisions which have wrestled with 
the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit's de­
cision in United States ex reL Siller v. Becton'Dickinson & Co. rep­
resents the most thorough and thoughtful analysis. 
B. Statutory Construction and Its Application in Section 
3730(e)(4) 
1. Plain Language 
In its interpretation of the jurisdictional bar in section 
3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit in Siller carefully applied a reasoned 
analysis of the plain language of the statute in combination with a 
judicious use of the appropriate legislative history.209 Accordingly, 
the Fourth Circuit's decision in Siller offers the best starting point 
for a reasoned analysis of the statute among the varied holdings of 
the other federal courts of appeals. 
The Siller court began its analysis by looking carefully at the 
plain language of the statute.210 To better understand the "original 
source" provision in section 3730( e)( 4), the court replaced the 
words "original source" in (e)(4)(A) with the words of its definition 
in (e)(4)(B). The court determined that the language of the statute, 
when read in this form, required only that the qui tam plaintiff: (1) 
have direct and independent knowledge of the information on 
which the allegations of false claim are based; and (2) voluntarily 
provide the information to the government before filing her qui 
tam suit.211 Read in this form, the plain language of the statute 
209, Id, 
210. Id. at 1351. See Stevens, supra note 179, at 1374, 
211. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351. With this substitution, according to the Fourth Cir­
cuit, subparagraph (A) would then be properly read as follows: 
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action ... based upon the public dis­
closure of allegations ... in a ... civil ... hearing ... unless . .. the person 
bringing the action . .. has direct and independent knowledge of the information 
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information 
to the Government before filing an action under this section which is based on 
the information. 
Id. (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (1988) (emphasis added». 
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imposes no additional requirement that the relator be a source to 
the original disclosing entity.212 
The Siller court's interpretation of the language of the statute 
was a direct rejection of the logic of the Second Circuit in 
LILCO.213 The Fourth Circuit noted that the Second Circuit in 
LILCO had focused on the word "information," which appears in 
both sub-paragraphs (A) and (B) of the statutory definition of 
"original source."214 The Second Circuit had concluded that the 
word "information" was intended to mean different things in each 
paragraph,215 and held that this "'slight difference in meaning ... 
permits the interpretation that [section] (4)(B) does not contain the 
exclusive requirements in order for one to be an 'original source' 
and that an additional requirement is to be found in [section] 
( 4)(A)."'216 
The Siller court disagreed with the Second Circuit's interpreta­
tion: "it is so unlikely that Congress would have even noticed the 
technical redundancy, that no significance can reasonably be in­
ferred."217 Instead, the Fourth Circuit in Siller argued that a 
straightforward reading of the language of the statute expressly 
contradicted the Second Circuit's interpretation and provided sup­
port for its conclusion that requiring a qui tam plaintiff to be a 
"whistle-blower" would be extra-textual.218 
2. Legislative History 
Although it found ample support within the plain language of 
the statute for its interpretation of the "original source" require­
ment in section 3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit went further and re­
viewed the complex legislative history of the Act to determine if its 
conclusion was supported by comments of the enacting Congress.219 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 1351-53 (citing United States ex reL Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 
912 F.2d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1990». 
214. Id. at 1352. 
215. Id. at 1351-53 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16). The textual analysis of the 
Second Circuit concluded that the word "infonnation" in § 3730(e)(4)(A) referred to 
the infonnation that has previously been publicly disclosed. The word "infonnation" in 
§ 3730(e)(4)(B), however, according to the Second Circuit, referred to the infonnation 
upon which the relator based her false claims suit. Id. (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16). 
See supra note 51 for the relevant text of § 3730(e)(4). 
216. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1352 (quoting LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 16). 
217. Id. at 1352. 
218. Id. at 1351-54 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d 13). See also Vogel, supra note 104, 
at 603. 
219. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1351-54. 
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The Fourth Circuit concluded that there were fundamental flaws in 
the Second Circuit's reliance on legislative history from the 1986 
amendments.22o The Siller court reasoned that the requitement 
that the relator be both independently informed of the allegations 
and also the source of their disclosure imposed "an additional, ex­
tra-textual requirement that was not intended by Congress."22l 
In rejecting the reasoning applied in LILCO, the Fourth Cir­
cuit pointed to a flaw in the Second Circuit's use of the legislative 
history of the 1986 amendments.222 The Fourth Circuit in Siller 
found that the Second Circuit had manufactured an ambiguity 
when it assigned two different meanings to the word 'important' in 
sections 3730(e)(4)(A) and (B) "in order to justify use of [legisla­
tive] history as dispositive evidence of congressional intent."223 Ac­
cording to the Siller court, the Second Circuit improperly based its 
analysis on legislative history for the 1986 amendments, which re­
ferred to language that was later significantly altered.224 The Sen­
ate Report that accompanied the 1986 amendments when they were 
reported to the floor of the Senate225 was based on statutory lan­
guage that was substantially changed between the time of the re­
port, July 26, 1986, and the final passage of the legislation, October 
7, 1986.226 "These ... changes suggest that, even assuming that 
Congress may at one point have intended a plaintiff to be a source 
to the disclosing entity [in order] to be an original source, which is 
220. Id. at 1352 
221. Id. at 1351.. "[I]t is unlikely that Congress intended implicitly to include this 
... requirement in the definition of original source .... [T]he relator'S role was anything 
but parasitic.... [T]he Second Circuit effectively overrode [the] judgment of Con­
gress." Vogel, supra note 104, at 603. 
222. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1352. 
223. Id. . 
224. Id. at 1352-55 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 17 (quoting 132 CoNG. REc. 20536 
(1986». The court in LILCO cited floor comments by Senator Grassley, sponsor of the 
amendments, that referred to a version of the amendments which was later significantly 
altered. Id. at 1353 (citing LlLCO, 912 F.2d at 17). After the Senate Report was filed, 
Congress deleted "the media" from the list of entities which the original source was 
required to inform. Id. Congress also inserted a provision requiring the qui tam plain­
tiff to inform the government "before filing [the] action." Id. (quoting 31 V.S.c. 
§ 3730(e)(4)(B) (1988». According to the Fourth Circuit, these two changes suggest 
that Congress did not intend to enact a provision into the law that would have required 
the plaintiff to be a source to the disclosing entity in order to qualify as an original 
source. Id. 
225. S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 2d Sess, (1986), reprinted in 1986 V.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266. 
226. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, Vol. 1 § 11, Vol 2 § 30. See also, Sil­
Ler, 21 F.3d at 1352-53 and supra note 224 for a discussion of some of the changes that 
were made in the bill after the Senate Report was submitted. 
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anything but clear, it ultimately chose not to enact such a require­
ment into law."227 
The Fourth Circuit in Siller noted further that the Ninth Circuit 
in Wang, although seemingly in accord with the Second Circuit's 
"whistle-blower" requirement, rested its conclusion on a completely 
different section of the Act's legislative history.228 The Siller court 
similarly rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis.229 
The Ninth Circuit in Wang had reasoned that one of the pur­
poses of the 1986 amendments to section 3730(e)(4) was to "cor­
rect" the holding in United States ex rei. Wisconsin v. Dean, where a 
plaintiff with first hand knowledge of fraudulent activity who had 
voluntarily disclosed information to the government was nonethe­
less barred from bringing a qui tam action.230 The Siller court 
noted, however, that the jurisdictional provision in effect at the 
time of the decision in Dean did not bar qui tam suits that were 
based upon prior public disclosures; the jurisdictional bar at that 
time prohibited only suits that were based upon "evidence or infor­
mation in the possession ofthe United States . .. at the time such suit 
was brought."231 The Fourth Circuit found that the Ninth's Cir­
cuit's error was in assuming, without explanation, that Congress 
would not have been able to "correct" Dean without requiring that 
a plaintiff have provided information to the disclosing entity.232 
The Siller court observed that the language of section 3730( e)( 4 )(B) 
provides that a plaintiff who has produced his independently ob­
tained information to the government is excepted from the jurisdic­
tional bar of section 3730(e)(4)(A) and that this requirement alone 
served to solve the problem presented by the court's decision in 
Dean.233 Thus, according to the Fourth Circuit,. a correction of 
Dean would not have forced Congress to require that a qui tam 
plaintiff provide information to the "disclosing entity" in order to 
227. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1353. 
228. Id. (citing Wang ex rei. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412, 1418-19 
(9th Cir. 1992». . 
229. Id. at 1353-54 (citing Wang, 975 F.2d at 1418-19).. . 
230. Id. at 1354 (citing United States ex reL State of Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F. 2d 
1100, 1104 (7th CiT. 1984); Wang, 975 F.2d at 1419 (citing S. REp. No. 345, 99th Cong., 
2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266). See supra notes 39-45 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of Dean. 
231. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1354 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 232(c) (1982) (superseded) (em­
phasis added». See supra note 35 for the relevant text of § 3730(b)(4) and supra notes 
39-45 for a discussion of Dean. 
232. Siller, 21 F.3d at 1354. 
233. Id. 
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be considered an "original source."234 The Siller analysis of the 
Act's legislative history demonstrates no support for the contention 
that Congress intended the relator to be a "whistle-blower" in order 
to maintain her suit under the False Claims Act.235 
C. 	 Additional Support for "Direct and Independent" as the 
Standard for Original Source 
1. 	 The Surrounding Language of the Statute 
When read in light of the surrounding sections of the jurisdic­
tional provisions in the statute,236 the implausibility of the extra­
textual requirement, imposed by LILCO and Wang in the applica­
tion of section 3730(e)(4), becomes more apparent. In section 
3730(d)(1), "Award to Qui Tam Plaintiff," the 1986 amendments to 
the False Claims Act specifically restrict the amount of an award 
that can be paid to a qui tam plaintiff where the action is one 
"which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of spe­
cific information (other than information provided by the person 
bringing the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a ... 
hearing, ... [or] report ... or from the news media."237 This section 
of the 1986 amendments comes directly before the jurisdictional 
provision in section 3730(e)(4) and does not refer to any require­
ment that the qui tam plaintiff be responsible for furnishing any of 
the information. to the disclosing entity.238 Moreover, section 
234. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. See Stevens,supra note 179, at 1376. 
237. 31 U.S.c. § 3730(d)(1) (1988). The full text of the applicable provision reads 
as follows: 
(1) If the Government proceeds with an action brought by a person under 
subsection (b), such person shall, subject to the second sentence of this para­
graph, receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25 percent of the proceeds 
of the action or settlement of the claim, depending upon the extent to which the 
person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the action. Where the 
action is one which the court finds to be based primarily on disclosures of 
specific information (other than information provided by the person bringing 
the action) relating to allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or admin­
istrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Account­
ing Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news media, the 
court may award such sums as it considers appropriate, but in no case more 
than 10 percent of the proceeds, taking into account the significance of the 
information and the role of the person bringing the action in advancing the case 
to litigation. 
Id. (emphasis added). See supra part I.A.3-4 for a full discussion of the 1986 
amendments. 
238. 	 § 3730(d)(1). 
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3730(d)(l) clearly anticipates that a plaintiff may file a suit under 
the False Claims Act where at least some of the information upon 
which the qui tam suit is based is not original with the relator.239 
As the two provisions share much of the same language,240 the fact 
that section 3730(d)(l) does not require the qui tam plaintiff to play 
a hand in the public disclosure of the allegations that form a part of 
the suit, coupled with the lack of any such requirement in section 
3730(e)(4), is compelling evidence that Congress believed the "orig­
inal source" language of (e)(4)(B) to be sufficient to protect it from 
parasitic actions. 
2. Post-Enactment Legislative History 
The Third Circuit in United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential 
Insurance Co. noted that "[t]he ... 1986 amendments underwent 
substantial revisions during [their] legislative path. This provides 
ample opportunity to search the legislative history and find some 
support somewhere for almost any construction of the many ambig­
uous terms in the final version. "241 In fact, Judge Scirica's dissent in 
Prudential used the same series of congressional reports and imple­
mentation hearings as the Prudential majority in support of his ar­
guments.242 As it was used to support the rationale of both the 
Prudential majority and the dissent, it seems that the pre-enactment 
legislative history of the False Claims Act offers no clearer guidance 
to congressional intent than does the language of the jurisdictional 
bar itself. 
If, however, the Senate had passed the 1992 amendments to 
the False Claims Act, and they had become law without further al­
teration, the question of "original source" would have been ren­
dered moot. 243 Although another new series of amendments was 
proposed in the House and Senate by the original sponsors of the 
239. Id. 
240. Compare the language of § 3730(d)(I), supra note 237, with 
§ 3730(e)(4)(A)'s description of public disclosure of "allegations or transactions in a 
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional administrative or Govern­
ment Accounting Office report, hearing, audit, or investigation, or from the news me­
dia ...." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). 
241. United States ex reL Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 (3d 
CiT. 1991). See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text. 
242. Prudential, 944 F.2d at 1162-76 (Scirica, J., dissenting). Judge Scirica, in a 
dissent that is actually longer than the majority opinion, completely retraces the legisla­
tive history of the False Claims Act. Id. 
243. See supra notes 72-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1992 
and 1993 amendments to the Act. 
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1986 amendments,244 to date the only bill that has actually been 
passed by Congress is House Bill 4563; the only committee report 
that has been issued is the Report from the House Committee on 
the Judiciary which accompanied House Bill 4563; no other bills 
have been passed and no other committee reports issued.245 An 
important question remains: do House Bill 4563 and its accompany­
ing committee report have any significance in the interpretation of 
section 3730(e)(4)? 
The role of subsequent legislative histOry in statutory construc­
tion has been subject to considerable debate.246 Notwithstanding 
the circuits' ability to find support in the legislative history of the 
Act for a variety of interpretations, Congress' fundamental purpose 
in the 1986 amendments was to encourage qui tam suits that were 
not parasitic in nature.247 Accepting this purpose, however, the 
problem for the courts is to determine exactly what constitutes a 
"parasitic suit." In their application of the jurisdictional bar, the 
LILCO and Wang courts have gone too far, barring suits in cases 
where the government has not filed suit and otherwise would not 
have recovered any damages.248 Inasmuch as contemporaneous 
legislative history has proven as ambiguous as the language of the 
statute itself,249 this is one of the rare instances in which judicious 
use of subsequent legislative history may be useful in statutory con­
struction.250 Although congressional debate is not an appropriate 
or reliable guide to the meaning of a statute, statements by commit­
tee chairmen or the legislative sponsors or authors may be entitled 
to some weight.251 Further, subsequent legislation on the same 
topic may be persuasive, as will.l;ommittee reports issued within 
244. See supra note 85-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1993 
amendments. 
245. Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, Billtext File, 101-104 (Feb. 17, 1995). See 
also Mintz, supra note 84, at B11. 
246. Araujo, supra note 178, at 125 & n.271. 
247. See Kaner, supra note 40, at 294. 
248. See Wang ex rei. United States v. FMC Corp., 975 F.2d 1412 (9th Cir. 1992); 
United States ex rei. Dick v. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990); see 
also, Kaner, supra note 40, at 294-95; Vogel, supra note 104, at 604; Oparil, supra note 
54, at 549. 
249. See United States ex rei. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1154 
(3d Cir. 1991). 
250. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the value 
and use of subsequent legislative history. . 
251. United States ex reL Cooper v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d 562 
(11th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. St. Paul M. & M. R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 310, 318 
(1918); S & E. Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 12-15 & n.9 (1972}). See 
also Araujo, supra note 178, at 131 (citing Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 
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five years by the same committee that originally reported on the 
previous legislation.252 
A review of Congress' post-enactment activity regarding the 
False Claims Act thus proves useful in evaluating the weight to be 
accorded the portion of the Act's legislative history. The House 
Committee on the Judiciary was responsible for the committee re­
ports that accompanied both House Bill 4827 in 1986 and House 
Bill 4653 in 1992.253 The sponsor of the 1992 amendments in the 
House was Representative Berman, the same individual who, to­
gether with Senator Grassley, was responsible for shepherding the 
1986 amendments through Congress.254 Although the 1992 House 
Committee Report on House Bill 4563 misses the recommended 
five year period by a few months, a court which was seeking gui­
dance on the true congressional intent of section 3730(e)(4) could 
find additional clarification in the language of the 1992 Amend­
ments and their accompanying report.255 Thus, the nature and 
quality of the post-enactment legislative activity is such that it may 
be accorded some weight in construing the statute.256 
The clear language of these amendments and the unambiguous 
interpretation of section 3730(e)(4) in the committee report fully 
support the conclusion that a qui tam plaintiff can bring suit under 
the False Claims Act even where she was not a source to the entity 
that publicly disclosed the allegations on which her suit is based.257 
The committee report for the 1992 amendments pointed specifically 
to the need to clarify the language of the jurisdictional bar because 
of various courts' incorrect interpretations, specifically citing what 
it termed to be the flawed decision of the Second Circuit in 
LILCO.258 As a result, the language of the 1992 amendments 
HARV. L. REv. 863, 888-89 (1930» & 140 (citing JACK DAVIES, LEGISLATIVE LAW AND 
PROCESS at § 15-1 (1986». 
252. See supra note 205. 
253. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, Vol. 2, § 11; H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess, 1 (1992). 
254. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, Vol. 2, § 25 at H6482; H.R. REp. No. 
837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1992). 
255. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of 
subsequent legislative history in statutory construction. 
256. See supra notes 199-205 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
weight to be accorded post-enactment legislative history. 
257. See H.R. 4563, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. (1992); H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d Cong., 
2d Sess. 14 (1992); United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 
1351-52 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994). 
258. H.R. REp. No. 837, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, 14 (1992) (quoting United States 
ex reL Dick V. Long Island Lighting Co., 912 F.2d 13 (2d Cir. 1990». See supra part 
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would have allowed a qui tam plaintiff to bring a suit as long as 
some part of her information did not come from a public disclo­
sure.259 Thus, the post-enactment legislative history of the False 
Claims Act is both useful and compelling evidence that the true 
congressional intent was not to require the relator to be a "whistle­
blower," as mandated by the courts in LILCO and Wang. 
Further, although House Bill 2915 and Senate Bill 841 were 
not passed by the 103d Congress, the congressional hearings on 
Senate Bill 841 afforded the sponsors of the original 1986 amend­
ments the opportunity to address the jurisdictional bar and offer 
clarifying interpretations of the original intent of Congress.2OO 
Thus, the 1992 amendments, their accompanying committee report, 
and the comments of Senator Grassley and Representative Berman 
in the hearings on the 1993 amendments provide some additional 
support for the Fourth Circuit's holding in Siller.261 Nonetheless, it 
must be remembered that Congress has, in fact, passed no new leg­
islation concerning the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act 
since the 1986 amendments.262 As a result, a reliance on the pro­
posed amendments as anything more than subtle support for the 
conclusion in the Siller court would be unwise. Despite what seems 
to be clear post-enactment evidence of congressional intent and 
purpose, the Court's return to textualism and Justice Scalia's re­
peated resistance to legislative history in any form suggest that the 
use of post-enactment legislative history is probably ill-advised.263 
Thus far, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to grant certi­
orari to review any federal court decisions interpreting the "original 
source" provision of section 3730(e)(4).264 In the Supreme Court's 
I.A.5 for a discussion of the specific language of the 1992 amendments and the accom­
panying committee reports. 
259. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1988). H.R. 4563, l02d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). See supra 
note 74 for the complete text of the proposed amendment. 
260. See 1993 Hearing, supra note 90. See also supra notes 90-94 and accompany­
ing text. 
261. See supra notes 199-205 for a discussion of the use of subsequent legislative 
history in statutory construction. 
262. Search of LEXIS, Legis Library, Billtext file, 101-104 (Feb. 17, 1995). 
263. See generally, Scalia, supra' note 183. 
264. The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in five cases dealing with the juris­
dictional bar in § 3730(e)(4). The Court has denied certiorari both in cases where the 
court found that the standard for "original source" was "direct and independent plus" 
and in cases where the court did not require the qui tam plaintiff to be the original 
source to the disclosing entity. See United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & 
Co., 21 F.3d 1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. a. 316 (1994) ("original source" satis­
fied by direct and independent knowledge); United States ex reL Barajas v. Northrop 
Corp., 5 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. a. 1543 (1994) ("original source 
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holding in United States ex rei. Marcus v. Hess, the Court sent a 
clear message to Congress that it would not correct the problems 
inherent in the statute.265 No such clear direction can be inferred 
from the Court's repeated denial of certiorari; nonetheless, the 
challenge of unifying the federal courts' interpretation of the "origi­
nal source" provision of the False Claims Act rests squarely on the 
shoulders of Congress. 
CONCLUSION 
The fundamental precept behind the passage of the original 
False Claims Act in 1863 was to enlist the aid of private citizens in 
exposing fraud committed against the federal government by un­
scrupulous contractors. While successive amendments to the Act 
attempted to limit the ability of private plaintiffs to capitalize on 
information concerning such fraud already in the public domain, 
the original purpose of the Act nonetheless remains intact: the fed­
eral government needs the assistance of private individuals in order 
to curtail fraud and recover stolen funds. 
The irreconcilable split among the various circuits over the 
proper interpretation of the "original source" provision contained 
in 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) is a reflection of the confusion this clause 
has engendered since its enactment. Of the rationales offered by 
the various courts of appeals that have considered the "original 
source" provision of 31 U.S.c. § 3730(e)(4), the Fourth Circuit's 
holding in United States ex rei. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co. is 
most faithful to the proper methodology of statutory construction. 
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the "original 
source" provision allows suits by private plaintiffs to go forward, 
effecting the primary purposes of the act, deterrence and recovery. 
As interpreted by the Fourth Circuit, the requirement that the 
plus"); United States ex rei. Precision Co. v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. O. 1364 (1993) ("original source" satisfied by direct and in­
dependent knowledge); United States ex reL Houck v. Folding Carton Admin. Comm., 
881 F.2d 494, 505 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1026, and cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1027 
(1990) ("original source" satisfied by direct and independent knowledge). 
265. See Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). U[T]he trouble with these argu­
ments [to deny jurisdiction] is that they are addressed to the wrong forum. Conditions 
may have changed, but the statute has not." Id. at 547. See also supra note 30 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the Court's direction to Congress in its decision in 
Hess. Congress was also directed to rewrite the legislation by the Seventh Circuit in its 
decision in United States ex reL Wisconsin v. Dean, 729 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1984). "If 
the State of Wisconsin desires a special exemption to the False Claims Act ... then it 
should ask Congress to provide the exemption." Id. at 1106. 
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plaintiff have "direct and independent" knowledge of any publicly 
disclosed allegations upon which her suit is based is sufficient to 
protect against suits that are parasitic in nature without the extra­
textual requirement that the "original source" have been the "whis­
tle-blower," an interpretation that would prevent many worthwhile 
qui tam suits from going forward. 
The United States Courts of Appeals should therefore be 
guided in their analysis of the "original source" provision of section 
3730(e)(4) by the Fourth Circuit's holding in Siller. The Fourth Cir­
cuit's decision utilizes fundamental statutory construction to ana­
lyze the plain language of the statute and supports its analysis with 
a judicious use of authoritative legislative history. After carefully 
reviewing the statute, contemporaneous legislative history, and rel­
evant case law, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a qui tam plaintiff 
may maintain her suit under the False Claims Act as long as she has 
direct and independent knowledge of the information upon which 
her claims are based and voluntarily provides that information to 
the government before filing her claim. 
The conclusion that a straightforward application of the "direct 
and independent" standard is sufficient to determine whether a re­
lator can qualify as an "original source" is further supported by the 
provision in the section of the statute that immediately precedes 
section 3730(e)(4), "Award to Qui Tam Plaintiff," which does not 
mention the "whistle-blower" requirement imposed by the courts in 
LILCO and Wang. Additional support for this conclusion is found 
in the passage by the House of amendments to the Act in 1992. The 
1992 amendments indicate that the original intent of Congress in 
the 1986 amendments to the Act is accurately reflected in the hold­
ing of the four circuits - the Fourth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits266 - which have ruled on the jurisdictional bar since the 
Ninth and Second Circuits established the "direct and independent 
plus" standard.267 
To insure clarity and uniformity in the interpretation of section 
266. See Cooper ex reL United States v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc., 19 F.3d 
562 (11th Cir. 1994); United States ex reL Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 
1339 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 316 (1994); United States ex reI. Springfield 
Terminal Ry. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States ex reI. Precision Co. 
v. Koch Indus., Inc., 971 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1992), cert.denied, 113 S. Ct. 1364 (1993). 
267. Although Congress' proposal of the 1993 amendments to the Act cannot be 
accorded significant weight as no legislation was passed, the statements of Sen. Grassley 
and Rep. Berman in hearings on the proposed amendments interpreting the original 
intent of the 1986 Amendments, also provide support the conclusion reached by the 
Fourth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See 1993 Hearings, supra note 90, at 3 & 6. 
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3730(e)(4), Congress should pass amendments to the Act such as 
those originally proposed in the 102d and 103d Congress. Such leg­
islation would discredit the contrary reasoning of the Second and 
Ninth Circuits and would result in unanimity on this significant is­
sue among the courts of appeals. The demonstrated impact of the 
False Claims Act on the public fisc since the passage of the 1986 
amendments - over a half billion dollars between the enactment of 
the amendments and the first quarter of 1994 alone - reinforces 
the need for consistency among the federal courts. A narrow read­
ing of the jurisdictional bar in section 3730(e)(4) will result in addi­
tional identification of fraudulent activities against the government 
and increased awards, which will both supplement the federal treas­
ury and act as a deterrent to unscrupulous contractors and suppli­
ers. Thus, the "Lincoln Law" will fulfill its original promise, and 
Congress will finally reach a reasoned and reasonable compromise 
between opportunity and opportunism. 
Susan G. Fentin 
